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Do Women Managers Keep Firms out of Trouble?  
Evidence from Corporate Litigation and Policies 
 
Abstract 
 
 We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, 
measured by female executives’ plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. 
This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by 
female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous 
equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid 
lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more 
aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties. 
 
Keywords: Women executives, Corporate litigation, Corporate policies 
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Do Women Managers Keep Firms out of Trouble?  
Evidence from Corporate Litigation and Policies 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Companies are frequently sued by various parties. For example, Walmart faces about 
five thousand small and large lawsuits every year by parties such as employees, customers, 
suppliers and competitors.1 Similarly, Apple fights numerous lawsuits over technology patent 
infringements every year. Companies spend considerable resources to avoid and defend 
themselves against lawsuits.2 This paper investigates a potential economic rationale for firms to 
adopt policies that subject them to lawsuits. The pursuit of profitable opportunities obviously 
requires firms to assume risk, including litigation risk. So there is likely an optimal level of 
lawsuits reflecting risky, but value-increasing, underlying firm policies. Accordingly, we 
examine whether some lawsuits arise because certain firm policies aimed at increasing 
shareholder wealth upset other groups such as customers, employees, suppliers, competitors, 
government and the community.  
 Specifically, we analyze the effect of top executives’ personal risk preferences on the 
adoption of risky firm policies, future lawsuits against their firms, and firm valuation. We expect 
that having more risk-averse executives will lead to less risky firm policies and fewer future 
lawsuits. But reducing lawsuits may not be value enhancing. One problem with testing these 
hypotheses is that executives’ risk-preference is an innate personality trait, which is largely 
unobservable. One observable proxy for their risk preference is their gender. Numerous studies 
                                                     
1 See Forbes story, ‘Wal-Mart Stands Up To Wave Of Lawsuits’ at http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/09/wal-mart-
lawsuits-cx_tvr_1109walmart.html. 
 
2 An estimate by John B. Henry in the Metropolitan Corporate Counsel (February 2008, p. 28) suggests that the 
annual direct litigation cost of Fortune 500 companies was a whopping $210 billion in 2006, i.e., about one-third of 
their after-tax profits that year. 
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have shown that female investors and executives are more risk-averse than their male 
counterparts. Female investors tend to invest more conservatively (see, e.g., Hudgens and Fatkin 
(1985), Johnson and Powell (1994), Sundén and Surette (1998) and Bernasek and Shwiff 
(2001)), and female executives adopt safer corporate policies (see, e.g., Faccio, Marchica and 
Mura (2015) and Francis et al. (2015)). Similarly, prior studies find that women also exhibit less 
overconfidence in decision-making (see, e.g., Estes and Hosseini (1988)) and less hubris about 
their abilities (e.g., Furnham, Hosoe and Tang (2002)). Moreover, women tend to be more 
trustworthy and more compliant with rules and regulations (see, e.g., Baldry (1987), Barnett, 
Bass and Brown (1994), Bernardi and Arnold (1997), Fallan (1999), and Beu, Buckley and 
Harvey (2003)). Therefore, we hypothesize that firms where women have more power in the top 
management team should adopt more conservative policies and consequently face fewer lawsuits 
in the future. 
 We measure women’s power in management by two variables. The first is the presence 
of two or more women in the top management team. This variable draws on the critical mass 
theory (e.g., Granovetter (1978), Kanter (1977a, 1977b)) and empirical evidence on it (e.g., 
Torchia, Calabrò and Huse (2011)), which suggests that the ability to form alliances and 
coalitions should give women more power to pursue their preferences. The second is the sum of 
the pay slices of all female managers out of the group of top five managers in a firm. Motivated 
by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), the pay slice measures the power and influence of 
women in the top management team.3 Using data on the filing dates of lawsuits disclosed to the 
SEC in 10K filings as material pending litigation, we examine all types of newly-filed lawsuits 
against S&P 1500 firms each year during 2002 to 2011.  
                                                     
3 Both measures rely on data reported in proxy statements on the compensation of the five highest-paid executives in 
a firm. To the extent that women executives are paid less than men, all else equal, these measures understate the role 
of women executives in a firm.  
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 We ask two questions: what do companies do that leads to their being sued, and why? 
The existing literature that examines these questions mostly focuses on securities class action 
lawsuits (see e.g., Gande and Lewis (2009), and Kim and Skinner (2012)), which are mostly 
brought by shareholders and represent a small subset (about 10%) of all material lawsuits filed 
against firms. Most lawsuits against companies are brought by other stakeholders or competitors. 
One of our unique contributions is that we analyze non-securities lawsuits, which have been the 
subject of scant research, and study them separately from securities lawsuits. While the latter are 
brought mostly by shareholders and mainly concern financial and disclosure decisions, the 
former are brought by other parties and mainly concern operating decisions (henceforth, we refer 
to them as ‘operating lawsuits’). As one of the first studies focused on operating lawsuits, our 
study is largely exploratory. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, our baseline regressions find that firms where women 
have more power in the top management team face fewer operating lawsuits the following year.4 
This result holds with both our measures of women’s power in management. This finding is 
robust to the inclusion of a number of firm-specific and executive-specific control variables and 
year and industry or firm fixed effects, and is supported by an analysis of changes to women’s 
power in management. The results also hold when we use a matching method to estimate the 
treatment effect in year t+1 of multiple women executives compared to a control sample of firms 
matched in year t that have similar characteristics important for risk and litigation but do not 
have multiple women executives.  Finally, we provide some evidence of both a selection effect 
of women choosing to work for firms with a lower risk-taking culture and a treatment effect of 
                                                     
4 Our tests focus on the lawsuit filing date rather than the dispute incidence date because data on the latter date is not 
available. However, as discussed in section 3.5 below, most lawsuits tend to be filed fairly soon, usually within six 
months to a year after a party feels that it has suffered harm. Therefore, in our baseline tests, variables measuring 
female executives’ power are lagged by one year relative to the lawsuit filing year. Our results are similar when we 
lag them by two or three years instead. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627846 
4 
 
women choosing lower-risk policies that invite fewer operating lawsuits. We do not find any 
significant relation between women’s power in management and future securities lawsuits. 
However, we find a negative relation between the presence of women on the board and future 
securities lawsuits, a result also found by Cumming, Leung and Rui (2015) using Chinese data.  
 The negative relation between women’s power in management and future lawsuits can 
arise from two non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: 1) female executives adopt less risky and 
less litigation-prone corporate policies, and 2) female executives settle out of court more 
frequently and for larger settlement amounts. Our evidence supports the first mechanism and 
casts some doubt on the second. First, as discussed below, we identify three risky and litigation-
prone firm policies and find that women’s power negatively predicts their use. Second, both in 
terms of the number of settlements and their dollar values, post-filing settlements are unrelated to 
women’s power in management in regressions of levels, and are negatively related to it in 
regressions of changes. While there is no data on settlements that occur before lawsuit filing, 
given the degree of risk-aversion of a defendant, the tendency to settle should be similar before 
and after lawsuit filing. But to the extent that the nature of pre- and post-filing settlements differs 
(e.g., pre-filing settlement may be more likely when lawsuit filing would be embarrassing for the 
defendant), our findings based on post-litigation settlements do not resolve this issue completely.  
 Finally, we attempt to uncover the underlying policies through which women’s power 
in management affects lawsuits against firms. Specifically, using a simultaneous equations 
framework, we ask three questions: 1) Which policies make a firm more susceptible to lawsuits? 
2) How does women’s power in management affect such policies? and 3) How do these policies 
contribute to firm valuation? We focus on three policies: aggressive R&D, more intensive 
advertising and promotion, and policies that may benefit shareholders but create negative 
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externalities for other parties. Estimates of our simultaneous equations system suggest that these 
three policies predict both more lawsuits against firms and higher firm valuation in the cross-
section. Our evidence suggests that by avoiding such policies, firms with multiple women in the 
top management team face about 0.19 fewer operating lawsuits the following year, but also forgo 
about 7% of firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. These results suggest that some lawsuits 
are a natural byproduct of value-increasing firm policies. Thus, fewer lawsuits against firms 
where women have more power suggest that women executives forego some risky and litigation-
prone firm policies that are value-increasing.  
 Our results raise two important questions. First, what prompts some firms to hire 
multiple women executives? Second, why do firms hire female executives if they shy away from 
risky policies that may invite more lawsuits, but would benefit shareholders? The first question is 
important because firms may hire more female executives specifically to reduce lawsuits, or for 
other reasons that eventually contribute to fewer lawsuits and lower firm value. We do not find 
that changes in lawsuits lead to future changes in the number of female executives. In fact, our 
change regressions do not find changes in any firm level variable to strongly predict future 
increases in female executives. This result is perhaps not surprising because large changes in 
female leadership are likely a slow process and are infrequent. We experiment with level 
regressions and find some evidence that variation in the number of female managers is likely due 
to long-term and gradual changes caused by industry and location-level factors. While the lack of 
obvious short-term ‘trigger events’ (as opposed to potential long-term trends) is somewhat 
reassuring in that our results do not appear to be driven by the selection of women executives to 
deal with lawsuit-related events, we cannot rule out the possibility of such events. Lack of this 
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knowledge limits our ability to claim that female executives cause policy changes responsible for 
fewer lawsuits against firms and decreases in firm value. 
 We now turn to the second question of why firms hire female executives if they avoid 
lawsuits at the cost of firm value. First, note that our findings do not imply that female 
executives’ power is either good or bad for overall firm value. Analyzing the effect of female 
executives on all firm policies is riddled with formidable endogeneity issues and is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Our analysis is limited to a few specific firm policies that are both value-
relevant and prone to lawsuits. In fact, our simultaneous equations suggest that female executives 
per se do not have a direct effect on value; all the effect comes from three policies that we 
analyze. If anything, the direct effect of multiple women executives is weakly positive. 
Moreover, several previous studies have uncovered positive aspects of female leadership in other 
specific situations. For example, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives adopt less 
risky but more sensible financing and investment policies. The market values their acquisition 
and debt issuance decisions more positively. Likewise, Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) find 
that firms with female top executives have higher survival rates and more stable profits. 
Therefore, our results likely point to an unintended consequence or a cost of hiring female 
executives.   
 
2. Data and Variables 
2.1 Sample and data 
 We collect data for our analyses from several sources. The data on lawsuit filings 
comes from Legal Cases and Legal Parties modules of the Audit Analytics database. Legal 
Cases feed provides case data on civil litigation filed in a federal district court (except New 
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Mexico) on matters filed in January 2000 or later involving public companies, disclosed to the 
SEC as material pending litigation. These cases are supplemented with securities class actions 
and SEC actions filed over the same time period. One advantage of our dataset is that we avoid 
the difficulty involved in separating significant lawsuits that are value-relevant from hordes of 
frivolous lawsuits. We broadly classify all lawsuits into securities and operating lawsuits. We 
collect data on newly filed cases during each year using filing dates reported in the feed. Legal 
Parties feed provides party data, such as party name, party status (i.e., plaintiff or defendant) and 
party's legal representation, for these cases.  
 We supplement this database with MSCI (formerly KLD and GMI) database on firms’ 
ratings on various aspects of corporate social responsibility. Company financials and stock price-
related variables come from CRSP-Compustat merged database. Data on the firms’ executives, 
their personal characteristics, and compensation etc. come from Execucomp database, which 
reports this data for the five highest paid executives of S&P 1500 firms. Data on board members 
come from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics) database. We 
obtain product market concentration and product similarity data, based on the product 
description sections of firms’ 10-K filings, from Hoberg and Phillips (2016) data library. 
Complete coverage in Legal Cases and Legal Parties databases begins in 2002, so our sample 
period begins in 2002 and ends in 2011. 
 
2.2 Main variables in the baseline analysis 
 Our main dependent variable of interest is lawsuits filed in which a firm is mentioned 
as a defendant in a given year. Audit Analytics classifies lawsuits into about 100 different types. 
One lawsuit can be classified into more than one type. We first count the number of lawsuits 
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filed against a firm in a given year based on the date when the lawsuit was filed (All Lawsuits). 
We then separate the lawsuits into two broad categories: 1) lawsuits related to securities laws, 
Securities Lawsuits, indicated in Audit Analytics by the variable IS_CATEGORY_TYPE_41, and 
2) lawsuits not related to securities laws, Operating Lawsuits, which are all other lawsuits. 
 Our main explanatory variable of interest is the lagged women’s power in the top 
executive team. Based on the list of top executives reported for a firm in ExecuComp, we 
measure this variable in two different ways. The first proxy for women’s power in management 
is the presence of two or more women in the top executive team (Female Execs ≥ 2), which is 
our measure of plurality. Our second proxy for women’s power in management is the sum of all 
female executives’ pay slice (Female Exec. Pay Slice), defined as the sum of the total 
compensation (TDC2) of all female executives scaled by the total compensation of all top 
executives. We also consider the effect of women’s presence on the board, via an indicator 
variable for whether a firm has a female independent director in last year (Female Indep. Dir. 
Indicator).  
 Our main list of control variables includes firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) because larger 
firms face more lawsuits on average; firm age because knowledge of various input and output 
markets gained from years of experience can affect lawsuits; stock returns and ROA5 because 
lawsuits are often caused by poor financial performance, which can force the firm to dishonor its 
implicit and explicit contracts with other stakeholders; cash holding because firms with deep 
pockets are more likely to be targets of lawsuits; stock volatility and financial leverage because 
they measure risk-taking by a firm and because leverage limits discretionary cash holdings that 
can affect the incentives of potential plaintiffs to sue the firm. Finally, we control for board 
                                                     
5 Our subsequent results are similar if we use the ratio of OIBD/Sales, instead of ROA, to measure financial 
performance. OIBD is operating income before depreciation and ROA is return on assets. While the latter is affected 
by a firm’s choice of leverage, the former is not. 
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independence based on Malm and Mobbs (2016), who find that firms with more independent 
boards face fewer lawsuits of different kinds. All explanatory variables are lagged by a year 
relative to the lawsuit filing dates. Where applicable we control for year fixed effects to account 
for any time-trend in lawsuits, and industry fixed effects using Fama and French (1993) 48 
industries to account for differences in litigation risk across industries. Other control variables 
used in our subsequent analysis are described in later sections. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents frequency distributions of female executives, directors and lawsuits in 
our sample. We have data on the number of female executives and the number and type of 
lawsuits for 8,388 firm-years in our sample. Of these, 5,922 firm-years have no female 
executive, and the remaining 2,466 have one or more women executives. Of the latter, 1,918 
firm-years have one woman executive and 548 have two or more. Similarly, 5,823 of the firm-
years have no lawsuits filed during the year, while the remaining 2,565 have one or more lawsuit 
filings. In the latter group, 1,471 firm-years have one lawsuit filing, 527 have two, and the 
remaining 567 have three or more. At least one operating (securities) lawsuit is filed in 2,390 
(368) firm-years. Altogether, 4,888 (539) operating (securities) lawsuits were filed against our 
sample firms during the sample period. 
 We also have data on the number of female directors for 7,745 firm-years in our 
sample. Of these, 2,869 firm-years have no female director, 3,048 have one such director, 1,460 
have two, and the remaining 368 have three or more. 
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 Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics of our main variables of interest. All the 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The mean number of lawsuits is 0.61 per firm-year, of 
which 0.55 are operating lawsuits and 0.06 are securities lawsuits. About 29% of the firm-years 
have one or more female executives among its top five executives and 7% have two or more. The 
average pay slice of women executives is 0.05. The mean of natural log of Tobin’s q in our 
sample is 0.52.  
 Panel B presents pairwise correlations between some of our main variables of interest. 
The correlations that are statistically significant at the 1% level or better are shown in bold. 
Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between our main lawsuit-related dependent 
variables and women’s power in management. But obviously these bivariate correlations do not 
control for ‘other things’ and do not take into account the non-normal distributions of the lawsuit 
variables. 
 
3.2 Are firms where women have more power sued less? 
 We next examine the relation between female executives and future corporate lawsuits 
in a regression framework. Our main dependent variable of interest, the number of lawsuits filed 
against a firm in a given year, is count data. So we first consider a Poisson model. But this 
variable exhibits greater variability than the Poisson distribution would predict and fails the equi-
dispersion test. So we use the negative binomial model, which can be considered a generalization 
of the Poisson model and allows for over-dispersion in the dependent variable.6  
 Table 3 reports the results from the negative binomial regression model. Panel A 
presents the results of All Lawsuits as the dependent variable. The regression model controls for 
                                                     
6 Nevertheless, our results are qualitatively similar when we use a Poisson model, instead. 
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other potential determinants of corporate litigation in the literature such as firm size, firm age, 
profitability, stock return, return volatility, leverage and female directors (see, e.g., Hutton, Jiang 
and Kumar (2015), and Malm and Mobbs (2016)). These variables are briefly described in 
section 2.2. The Appendix defines all the variables used in the main analysis. All the models 
include year and Fama and French (1993) 48 industry fixed effects.  
 Column 1 of Table 3, Panel A reports the results of the regression of All Lawsuits in 
year t+1 on Female Execs=1, which indicates the presence of one woman in the top executive 
team, and Female Execs ≥ 2, which indicates the presence of two or more female executives. The 
presence of just one woman in the top executive team is unlikely to give her much sway over 
corporate policies. But the presence of multiple women in the team allows them to form 
coalitions and gives them greater power and influence over firm policies. Consistent with this 
idea, in column 1, Female Execs=1 has no effect on lawsuits, but Female Execs ≥ 2 predicts the 
number of lawsuits next year negatively and significantly.7  
 The nature of securities lawsuits is quite different from operating lawsuits. As 
discussed in the introduction, the former are mostly brought by shareholders and usually concern 
stock price declines and disclosure issues, while the latter involve operating decisions and are 
brought by other parties. So, we next examine in columns 2 and 3 whether a significant presence 
of female executives has a similar effect on the two types of lawsuits. We find that women’s 
power negatively predicts only operating lawsuits in year t+1; it has no significant effect on 
securities lawsuits. This is an important finding and is consistent with the notion that managers, 
                                                     
7 In an untabulated test, we replace the two indicator variables for Female Execs in this regression by a Female 
Executive Indicator (0/1) variable. The coefficient on the latter indicator variable is negative but statistically 
insignificant. This result suggests that merely having a woman in the top management team does not predict the 
number of lawsuits against a firm. As shown in Table 1, firm-years with non-zero women executives have mostly 
just one woman, which swamps the effect of multiple women that we see in the regression in column (1). 
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who are mainly responsible for company operations, only affect operating lawsuits.8 In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficient estimate on Female Execs ≥ 2 from column 2 suggests 
that  compared to having no woman in the top executive team, having two or more female 
executives reduces the predicted number of next year’s operating lawsuits by 0.08, when all 
other variables take their mean values. This reduction is non-trivial, considering that the 
unconditional mean (median) number of such lawsuits is only 0.55 (0). 
 On the other hand, gender diversity on the board seems to affect securities lawsuits 
only. This is another important finding. Board composition matters for securities lawsuits likely 
because securities lawsuits mainly involve disclosure and governance issues, where the board 
plays a direct oversight role (see, e.g., Brochet and Srinivasan (2013), Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard (2003), and Strahan (1998)). Our finding of a negative relation between board gender 
diversity and securities lawsuits is consistent with those of Cumming, Leung and Rui (2015) for 
China. We focus on our new contribution of women’s power in management on operating 
lawsuits and its implications. 
 In panel B of Table 3, we use the pay slice of female executives as our second measure 
of women’s power in management and estimate regressions similar to those in columns (1) to (3) 
of Panel A. This alternative measure also obtains a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in predicting next year’s operating lawsuits. In particular, firms where women 
managers have more power, as measured by their pay slice, face fewer operating lawsuits in year 
                                                     
8 In another untabulated test, we replace the two indicator variables for Female Execs in this regression by three 
overlapping variables: Female Execs ≥ 1, Female Execs ≥ 2, and Female Execs ≥ 3. Consistent with our main 
results, we find that almost all the effect of women’s power on operating lawsuits comes from Female Execs ≥ 2, 
whose coefficient remains negative and statistically significant. The incremental effect of Female Execs ≥ 3 is 
negative, but smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant (-0.190, t=-0.81), consistent with diminishing 
marginal returns. None of the three female executive variables significantly predicts securities lawsuits. 
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t+1. However, female managers’ power is unrelated to next years’ securities lawsuits.9 In terms 
of economic significance, the results in column (2) suggest that compared to a firm with Female 
Exec. Pay Slice of zero, a firm with a 20% pay slice (equivalent to one female executive with a 
pay slice equal to that of each of the other four top executives), faces 0.036 fewer operating 
lawsuits. This effect is sizeable, but understandably smaller than that of Female Execs ≥ 2. 
 Most control variables assume expected signs. Not surprisingly, larger firms face more 
lawsuits of both kinds. This finding is consistent with their more complex operations that give 
rise to more disputes, and their deeper pockets that make them more attractive targets of 
lawsuits. Consistent with the idea that a large stock price decline is the core trigger for securities 
lawsuits, the coefficient of prior stock returns is significantly negative in regressions of securities 
lawsuits, as previously found in Kim and Skinner (2012). While this coefficient is also negative 
in regressions of operating lawsuits, its magnitude is much smaller and statistically insignificant. 
Perhaps these negative stock returns reflect operational (cash flow) difficulties leading to 
nonperformance of contracts and to lawsuits. Having more cash attracts more lawsuits of both 
kinds, though its coefficient is statistically significant only for operating lawsuits. Book leverage 
negatively predicts operating lawsuits, plausibly because financial risk posed by higher leverage 
discourages managers from taking more operational risk, resulting in fewer lawsuits. While stock 
volatility positively predicts both types of lawsuits, the effect is much larger for securities 
                                                     
9 We use two proxies for women’s power in management to ensure that our results are not sensitive to our variable 
choice. However, the two measures are not quite independent. As seen in Panel B of Table 2, the correlation 
between Female Execs ≥ 2 and Female Exec. Pay Slice is a whopping 0.65. When we include both variables in the 
same regression, the latter subsumes the effect of the former in operating lawsuits, while the two variables take 
opposite signs for securities lawsuits, likely reflecting multicollinearity. We believe that our count-based variable is 
a cleaner measure of power and coalitions than pay slice because the latter may also be subject to governance issues 
(see, e.g., Bebchuk et al. (2011)). So we present most of the results in the paper based on the count-based measure. 
However, our results go in the same direction regardless of which measure we use. 
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lawsuits, where adverse stock price movements (which affect stock volatility) are often at the 
heart of the cases. 
 
3.3 Is the relation between female executives and lawsuits driven by self-
selection? 
 Our baseline models yield a robust negative relation between women’s power in 
management and operating lawsuits. This observed relation can be a result of two non-mutually 
exclusive processes. The first is the self-selection, i.e., firms and executives select each other 
based on firm culture and individual preferences. For example, some companies likely have a 
culture of avoiding excessive risk to avoid lawsuits. Female executives, who tend to be more 
risk-averse than their male counterparts, may choose to work for these firms, which may find 
that women fit their risk-averse culture better. The second explanation is a causal effect, i.e., 
women’s power in management leads a firm to adopt safer policies that avoid the risk of 
lawsuits. Our tests are motivated by theories and previous empirical findings of managerial risk 
aversion. But our conclusions are not dependent on the evidence of strict causality. In fact, 
female executives choosing to work for firms with a culture of lower risk-taking is also 
consistent with female executives’ greater risk-aversion. Nevertheless, we try to distinguish 
between the selection and treatment effects using three approaches.  
 First, we conduct a matched sample analysis where we match the firms with Female 
Execs ≥ 2 to firms without them in the previous year, based on firm characteristics important for 
risk and litigation. We match the samples based on the nearest neighbor of continuous variables 
(Ln(Total Assets), Firm Age, Stock Return, Stock volatility, and ROA), and exact match by year, 
Fama and French 48 industry and the presence or absence of female directors. Table 4 shows that 
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firms where female executives have more power (Female Execs ≥ 2) in year t face fewer lawsuits 
in year t+1 when compared to a sample of firms with very similar risk characteristics in year t. 
The average treatment effect (ATE) implies that firms with multiple women top executives face 
0.236 fewer operating lawsuits per year compared to the control sample.10 This effect is quite 
large compared to the average annual number of 0.55 such lawsuits against a sample firm. This 
result is consistent with our main regression analysis and the treatment effect model results in 
Table 9 below. This result suggests a treatment effect of female executives on lawsuits, as 
opposed to a selection effect, because we compare lawsuits in year t+1 faced by two groups of 
firms that have similar probabilities of having multiple female executives and similar risks in 
year t, but one group has multiple female executives and the other does not. However, our 
matching variables may not be good enough. This is a general limitation of any matched sample 
analysis, which depends on observable and imperfectly measured firm characteristics. Given this 
limitation, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that an omitted variable may be driving 
both the increase in female executives and the decrease in lawsuits. 
 Second, we use a firm-fixed effects model that relates within-firm variation in female 
power in management to variation in lawsuits against firms. This model controls for fixed firm-
specific factors (both observable and unobservable) such as firm culture and industry practices, 
which tend to be slow-moving and therefore unlikely to change within our sample period. In 
untabulated results, we show the results of firm-fixed effects models corroborate those from the 
baseline models. We find that both our measures of women’s power in management predict 
operating lawsuits negatively and significantly; they do not predict securities lawsuits. Since the 
                                                     
10 The results are similar (ATE = -0.297, z-statistic = -3.39) when the set of matching variables also includes Advtg. 
Intensity, CSR Concerns and R&D/Assets, which we discover as litigation-prone firm policies in section 4 below. 
Because these three are outcome variables (i.e., firm policies), rather than control variables, we tabulate the results 
of the model without these as matching variables.  
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variation in women’s power within a firm predicts the variation in future lawsuits, our results are 
not driven by a firm’s time-invariant risk-culture. The magnitude of this effect is a substantial 
0.15 fewer operating lawsuits per year in firms with multiple women at the top compared to 
firms without them. 
 Our third approach examines the relation between lagged changes in female power on 
changes in lawsuits. Table 5 presents the first difference model separately for operating lawsuits 
and securities lawsuits. The main explanatory variables are the indicator for multiple women 
executives and its lag. Results using pay-slice measures are similar but are not reported for 
brevity. For each type of lawsuit, our analysis includes models that use (1) the full sample, (2) 
the sub-sample of years where there was a non-zero change in the number of lawsuits, and (3) 
the sub-sample of years where there was a non-zero change in the number of female executives 
in the top executive team. The dependent variable is the difference in the natural log of 1 plus the 
number of lawsuits from t to t+1. In all of the models, we find that a change in women’s power 
in the top executive team predicts a significant decrease in operating lawsuits the next year. 
Together, these three tests provide some evidence of a causal effect of women’s power in 
management on operating lawsuits against a firm. 
 Our results raise an important question: What prompts some firms to hire multiple 
women executives? Specifically, do firms hire more female executives to reduce lawsuits, or for 
other reasons that eventually contributed to the reduction in lawsuits and firm value?11 In Table 
6, we analyze whether changes in the number of past lawsuits a firm faces or changes in any 
other firm-level variables predict future changes in women’s power. We find that past changes in 
neither securities lawsuits nor operating lawsuits predict changes in the presence of multiple 
                                                     
11 As an example of the latter possibility, maybe female executives were hired to replace male executives who made 
some bad acquisitions that drained cash. The stock drops as the market learns more about these acquisitions. At the 
same time, the firm is compelled to cut back on some risky, but valuable, R&D projects due to a lack of funding. 
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female managers [models 1 and 2]. In model 3, we limit the subsample to the years with non-
zero changes in operating lawsuits, but still find no effect of such changes on changes in 
women’s power the next year. Moreover, we do not find changes in any other firm-level 
variables (not tabulated for brevity) in these models (that may point to ‘trigger events’) that lead 
to an increase in female power. These results are perhaps not surprising because large changes in 
female leadership are likely a slow process and are infrequent. So it is difficult to pinpoint what 
causes these changes from the difference regressions. Finally, we experiment with level 
regressions, such as the one shown in column 4, predicting the presence of multiple female 
executives. In level regressions also, we do not find any evidence that female executives’ power 
is related to past lawsuits. In level regressions predicting Female Execs ≥ 2, industry and state 
fixed-effects seem more important because they vastly increase the predictive power (adjusted 
R2) of these models. So, female executives’ power is likely to be a product of long-term and 
gradual changes due to industry and location-level factors, perhaps driven by local labor market 
conditions. We find that some firm-level variables are also significant, but their overall 
explanatory power is quite low (adjusted R2 = 0.016 without vs. 0.080 with industry and state 
fixed effects).  
 While the lack of specific ‘trigger events’ is somewhat reassuring in that our results do 
not appear to be driven by the selection of women executives to deal with lawsuit-related events, 
we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of such events. Our finding in section 4 that fewer 
operating lawsuits are not necessarily good for shareholders can potentially explain why firms do 
not add women managers in response to an increase in the number of such lawsuits. But the lack 
of specific knowledge about why firms sometimes increase the number of female executives 
limits our ability to claim a causal effect of female executives on firm policies. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627846 
18 
 
3.4 Do women executives settle more easily? 
 Our results so far show a significantly negative relation between women’s power in 
management and the number of operating lawsuits filed against a firm. This result can arise from 
two non-mutually exclusive channels. First, female executives adopt firm policies that are less 
susceptible to lawsuits. For example, they are less likely to develop products that infringe on a 
competitor’s intellectual property rights. Second, female executives adopt similar policies as 
their male counterparts and face similar litigation risk. However, they prefer settling disputes 
privately, which has a definite outcome, to fighting them in the court. That is, to avoid protracted 
legal fights, perhaps women executives settle more easily and pay larger settlement amounts than 
their male colleagues. 
 Our data only includes cases that are filed in the court, so we do not observe potential 
lawsuits that are settled before they reach the court. However, we do have some data on cases 
that are settled after they are filed with a court. Cases can be settled outside the court even after 
they go to the court as both parties update their beliefs about the outcome of a case. If higher 
risk-aversion of women executives predicts a higher probability of settling cases outside of the 
courts, this should be true both before and after the cases are filed with the courts.   
 In Table 7, we present the results of regressions of post-filing settlement counts and 
settlement amounts. The first two columns present the results of settlement counts using negative 
binomial models and firm fixed effects. They show that women’s power does not significantly 
predict the number of cases that are settled out of court. The results are similar for the next two 
models of the natural log of dollar settlement amounts. Once again, from both negative 
binominal and firm fixed effect models, women’s power in management are statistically 
insignificant in predicting dollar settlements. Overall, Table 7 offers no evidence that firms with 
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more women executives settle more cases or pay larger settlement amounts after the cases are 
filed in court. These results likely reflect firms’ reluctance to create incentives for potential 
plaintiffs to sue more once they realize that firms with more women managers are easier targets. 
These results do not support the idea that the observed relation between women’s power in 
management and lawsuits against firms is due to differences in settlements.12 But to the extent 
that the nature of pre- and post-filing settlements differs (e.g., pre-filing settlement may be more 
likely when lawsuit filing would be embarrassing for the defendant), our findings based on post-
litigation settlements do not resolve this issue completely. 
 
3.5 Timing of dispute incidence and lawsuit filing 
 Our tests focus on the lawsuit filing date rather than the dispute incidence date because 
the latter date is not reported in the Audit Analytics (AA) database. We started by trying to 
identify this date ourselves. For a random sample of 20 cases from our sample, we obtained and 
read (rather lengthy) complaint filings by doing internet searches using case docket numbers 
from AA, but were unable to identify clear start dates for the disputes. Melody Banks, the 
Director of Litigation Research at AA told us in an e-mail exchange in May 2018 that they have 
found over the years that the latter date is very hard to identify from case filings for the operating 
lawsuits that we focus on. The only lawsuits for which AA has this date are securities class 
action lawsuits, where the case filing specifies a start and end date of the class. Based on our 
conversations with a few law professors, we learned that dispute start dates are hard to pinpoint 
                                                     
12 In unreported tests, we also estimate first difference regressions of settlement counts and settlement amounts 
similar to those in Table 5.   In both regressions, the coefficient of(Female Execs ≥ 2) variable is negative and 
significant at the 10% level, which runs counter to the prediction of the settlement story. In similar regressions 
where we replace (Female Execs ≥ 2) by Δ(Female Exec. Pay Slice), the coefficient of the latter variable is 
statistically insignificant. 
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in non-securities lawsuits because disputes often arise not at a specific date but over time. From 
these conversions we also learned that most lawsuits tend to be filed fairly soon, usually within 
six months to a year after a party feels that it has suffered harm. Lawyers typically advise clients 
to file a case as soon as possible (1) because it is easier to gather evidence and bring a charge 
while the case is relatively fresh and, (2) because of statutes of limitation. Therefore, in our 
baseline tests in Table 3, all the explanatory variables are lagged by one year relative to the 
lawsuit filing year, which seems to be a reasonable compromise based on this information. Our 
untabulated results are similar when we lag female executives’ power by two or three years 
instead. 
 The lack of precise data on dispute incidence dates introduces noise in our tests. 
However, this noise in the alignment of disputes with female executives’ power should lead to an 
attenuation bias, making it more difficult to find significant results (see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002, 
pp. 75)). Moreover, our findings in section 4 suggest that lawsuits arise because of aggressive 
firm policies such as excess R&D, intensive advertising and promotion, and policies that are 
inimical to other parties that a firm deals with or that are affected by its business practices. These 
findings suggest that the settlement story does not dominate our results. We leave a complete 
resolution of this issue to future research. 
 
4. A simultaneous equations model of firm policies, litigation risk and 
valuation 
 So far, we have established that firms in which female managers are more powerful 
face fewer operating lawsuits. We provide some evidence to suggest that the relation is unlikely 
to be driven by a greater propensity of female manages to settle. An important question is 
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whether greater exposure to the risk of such lawsuits necessarily hurts firm valuation. The 
answer to this question likely depends on the reasons behind a firms’ exposure to such lawsuits. 
There are at least two possibilities for a firm’s greater exposure to operating lawsuits: 1) 
managers take actions that benefit stockholders at the expense of other stakeholders, and 2) 
managers take actions that harm both shareholders and other stakeholders. In this section we test 
whether a firm’s exposure to lawsuits predicts its valuation, and if so, why. The first possibility 
implies that lawsuits should be positively related to firm valuation, while the second possibility 
implies that they should be negatively related to it. 
 Prominent examples that support the first story are the numerous lawsuits between 
Apple and Samsung that became part of the smartphone ‘patent wars’. Both companies are 
fiercely competitive and innovative. As a result, while they are highly valued by investors, they 
often they end up infringing on each other’s property rights. Moreover, both also compete 
fiercely on price, so they are under tremendous pressure to cut production costs. As a result, they 
are routinely criticized for dealing with suppliers that treat their workers unfairly.13 
 We expect that female executives affect some firm policies, and those policies, in turn, 
affect litigation risk and firm valuation simultaneously. To test this hypothesis, we employ a 
simultaneous equations system that allows us to model how the power of female executives 
predicts various firm policies that affect a firm’s litigation exposure and whether and how these 
policies affect firm valuations. 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 See, for example, ‘Apple failing to protect Chinese factory workers,’ http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
30532463.  
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4.1 The empirical model  
 Given the lack of theories specific to operating lawsuits, we do not have true structural 
equations. So our study is largely exploratory. Following the recommendations of Gow, Larcker 
and Reiss (2016), we make inferences about potential cause and effect by relying on previous, 
more general theoretical and empirical findings, and make use of path diagrams to motivate our 
system of regression equations. We start by considering a few ‘candidate’ corporate policies that 
previous studies have found to be value-relevant but risky, and explore if these policies entice 
operating lawsuits. These policies include aggressive investment in research and development 
(R&D), capital expenditure, acquisitions, and advertising expenditure. We also consider a firm’s 
relations with other stakeholders and the broader community using KLD data on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Several studies have found that R&D is an important vehicle for growth 
and value-creation. However, R&D endeavors are risky because they have long gestation periods 
and high probabilities of failure.14 More importantly, R&D and innovation-related activities are 
highly susceptible to lawsuits. For example, competitors or other patent assertion entities (aka 
‘patent trolls’) can sue a firm for violating intellectual property rights (see, e.g., Boldrin and 
Levine (2002), Bessen, Meurer and Ford (2011), Jaffe and Lerner (2011), Cohen, Gurun and 
Kominers (2016), and Smeets (2014)). Moreover, coming up with new products, especially 
under time-pressure to outdo competitors, leads firms to make mistakes that result in product 
liability lawsuits (see, e.g., Herbig and Golden (1994), and Hunziker and Jones (1994)). To a 
lesser extent, similar arguments apply to capital expenditures and acquisitions, which tend to be 
riskier than firms’ ongoing operations, and therefore are more susceptible to lawsuits. However, 
as discussed later, we find that capital expenditure and acquisitions do not significantly affect 
                                                     
14 See, e.g., Holmstrom (1989); Manso (2011), Tian and Wang (2014) and Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) 
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lawsuits after accounting for the simultaneity in the system, so we do not analyze them as 
endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations system, but include them as controls. 
 We analyze advertising expenditure as another policy variable that potentially affects 
lawsuits and firm valuation. Joshi and Hanssens (2010) document a positive effect of advertising 
expense on firm value through various indirect and direct channels. Whereas Joshi and Hanssens 
(2010) analyze a sample of only four large companies in the computer manufacturing industry, 
we use a much more comprehensive sample. Moreover, we believe that ours is the first study to 
examine whether advertising intensity is also associated with operating lawsuits. Advertising 
intensity can influence litigation risk through several channels. First, as suggested by Servaes 
and Tamayo (2013), advertising increases customer awareness of a firm’s products and its 
activities (both good and bad) that matter to stakeholders. Greater awareness of good deeds may 
increase customer loyalty to the firm and its products and services, while awareness of bad deeds 
can invite litigation. So, for a given level of product quality and firm involvement in actions 
affecting broader stakeholders, advertising intensity offers a risk-return trade-off: it promotes the 
company and its products, but also subjects the firm to greater scrutiny. Second, Joshi and 
Hanssens (2010) find that a firm’s advertising expense has a negative effect on its competitors’ 
valuations. This effect can intensify rivalry and attract scrutiny and lawsuits from disgruntled 
competitors. Third, aggressive promotion can also increase the chances of deceptive advertising, 
thereby attracting lawsuits.15 David, Markowitz and Richards-Shubik (2010) find that aggressive 
                                                     
15 A prominent anecdote is DeVry Education Group, which in 2016 fired Daniel Hamburg, its CEO for nine years, 
following allegations of misleading advertising by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Interestingly, Hamburg 
was considered a transformative CEO, as mentioned in the statement by the company’s board chair “Under his 
leadership, DeVry Group has transformed from primarily serving undergraduate and business school students in 
the United States to a global education provider.…” Presumably, promotion of the university and its program, 
which claimed that “90 percent of graduates actively seeking employment landed jobs” was one of the biggest 
factors that had led to the company’s success. DeVry’s advertising to sales ratio was about 13% at the time, 
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advertising of a drug to consumers reduces its match with the patient, which increases the 
reported rate of adverse drug reactions and leads to greater regulatory action. 
 Finally, we consider a firm’s policies on environmental, social and human rights issues 
as a potential link between women executives’ power, litigation risk and firm valuation. In 
particular, we analyze CSR concerns using KLD data as a way to capture any remaining policies 
that may be related to lawsuits, and may have implications for firm valuation. Using a variety of 
public sources and its private survey of firms, KLD collects data on corporate policies, practices 
and events that affect firm stakeholders on a variety of dimensions. These dimensions include 
environment, community, employment, diversity, product and human rights. Any policy, practice 
or event that raises a red flag (points to a strength) on any of these dimensions is recorded as a 
concern (strength) on that dimension for the firm. Importantly, KLD attempts to record strengths 
and concerns as soon as these events become known to their analysts. So while KLD concerns 
may not be reflected in current lawsuits against a firm, they can lead to disputes with various 
stakeholders that increase the probability of the firm being sued in the future.16 Following Di 
Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), we assume that KLD concerns are outcomes of a firm’s policies, 
including CSR policies, whereas strengths are a result of proactive investments in CSR. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
much higher than our sample mean (median) of 3.2% (1.4%) among firms with non-missing advertising 
expenses on Compustat. 
 
16 Here are some examples from Krüger (2015) showing  how KLD concerns can lead to lawsuits against a firm: 
 In May 2006, the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) included ADM on its Toxic 100, a list of the 
top 100 corporate air polluters in the U.S. ADM ranked tenth on the Toxic 100, which is based on the 
quantity and toxicity of hundreds of chemicals released into the air. 
 In February 2007, two Swiss charities reported that workers faced low wages and health risks in factories in 
China, Thailand, and the Philippines that supplied five companies, including Apple. 
 In October 2007, in two separate incidents, the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission 
recommended that Family Dollar Stores recall children’s toys because they contained excessive levels of 
lead in their paint. 
Moreover, Krüger (2015) finds that although there is persistence in KLD scores, they reflect contemporaneous 
events. 
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Therefore, we examine whether women’s power in management predicts KLD Concerns, which 
can lead to potential future lawsuits.  
 The corresponding simultaneous equations system is as follows: 
Operating Lawsuits = l0 + l1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1 + l2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + l3(Excess R&D)  + 
l4(Advtg. Intensity) + l5(CSR Concerns) + Xλ + ZAΛ + εl 
Excess R&D   = r0 + r1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + r2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xρ + ZBB  + εb 
Advtg. Intensity   = a0 + a1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + a2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xα + ZΑΑ  + εa 
CSR Concerns  = c0 + c1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + c2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xγ + ZΓΓ  + εc 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) = m0 + m1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1 + m2(Female Execs=1)t-1 + m 3(Excess 
R&D) + m4(Advtg. Intensity)  + m5(CSR Concerns) + m6(Operating Lawsuits) +  Xμ + 
ZMM  + εm         (1) 
A simplified path diagram for our system is as follows: 
 
 This path diagram illustrates our main hypothesis that significant power of female 
executives influences litigation through the three policies that are also relevant for valuation 
(paths of solid arrows). In other words, greater female power in management predicts firm 
policies, which simultaneously affect both exposure to operating lawsuits and firm valuation. We 
also allow the system to determine if female power affects valuations and lawsuits directly 
Figure 1. Path diagram of Female Executives’ Power, Firm Policies, Lawsuits and Firm Valuation 
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(dashed arrows, coefficients m1 and l1 respectively). Although we do not have any specific 
hypothesis regarding this direct (structural) relation, a direct effect may represent any 
unobservable differences caused by the styles of male and female executives or potentially 
value-relevant variables omitted from the system. Finally, we allow the system to determine if 
litigation exposure is directly associated with firm valuation (dashed arrow: coefficient m6). 
Because the system may not have included all the relevant variables for valuation and lawsuits, a 
direct association between lawsuits and firm valuation may be due to some relevant policy 
variables that are omitted from the system.17 
 Xs in system (1) are matrices of common control variables, i.e., those that appear in 
two or more equations in the system, e.g., year and industry fixed-effects, and firm size. Zs are 
matrices of control variables that are unique to an equation and serve as the identifying variables 
in the system. We discuss more about control variables and identifying restrictions in section 
4.2.18 
 To estimate Excess R&D etc., we follow Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) and estimate 
a firm-specific model of investment as a function of growth opportunities, as measured by past 
sales growth. Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) aggregate three major components of investment 
(R&D, Capital Expenditure and Acquisitions). We analyze each component separately because 
                                                     
17 Obviously, there likely are other firm policies that affect litigation risk and valuation. Our choice to focus on these 
three policy variables represents a trade-off between tractability and completeness. We do not claim to be 
exhaustive, but try to include important policy variables that are well-established in the literature. While adding 
more endogenous policy variables can be more informative, it makes identification of the system more difficult. 
 
18 A well-identified system of regression equations satisfies rank and order conditions. Having unique variables in 
each equation serves satisfies these conditions. Our system is over-identified and has more reduced-form parameters 
than structural parameters. 
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prior studies suggest that these policies affect risk and firm valuation differently, and they likely 
have different sensitivities to growth opportunities.19 
 R&Di,t or Capexi,t or Aquisi,t  = β0 + β1 * Sales Growthi,t-1 + εi,t 
 Sales Growtht-1 is the percentage change in sales from t-2 to t-1. Following previous 
papers, we estimate this equation for each Fama-French 48 industry-year. We estimate excess 
investments as follows: 
 Excess R&Di,t or Capexi,t  or Aquisi,t  = Actual  - Predicted (R&Di,t or Capexi,t or Aquisi,t) 
 Moreover, unlike Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009), who rank these residuals to 
construct over- or underinvestment variables, we take an agnostic approach. For instance, a 
positive excess R&D can either be a symptom of overinvestment (hence bad for firm valuation) 
or a value-enhancing decision by managers who see opportunities beyond those conveyed by 
past sales growth. We allow the data to separate such differences. 
 Our choice of empirical models for this test is worth explaining. We are less interested 
in testing the effect of realized lawsuits against a firm in a given year because, not surprisingly, 
lawsuit filings lead to stock price declines, at least in the short run. Instead, our goal is to assess 
how lawsuits against a firm, which are a symptom of some underlying firm policies and 
practices, predict firm valuation. Therefore, we adopt a cross-sectional test of female executive 
power, firm policies, litigation and firm valuation, rather than a time-series test.  
 
 
                                                     
19 R&D is considered a much riskier investment than capital expenditures. Investments in R&D and innovation are 
risky but value-enhancing (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012)). However, several studies on the ‘asset 
growth anomaly’ find that asset growth via capital expenditures can be a symptom of poor governance and can be 
value-decreasing (see, e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)). The risk effect of acquisitions is ambiguous, with 
some acquiring firms experiencing an increase in risk, while others experience a decrease (see, e.g., Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) and Gormley and Matsa (2016)). 
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4.2 Control variables and identification 
 In this section, we briefly discuss some theories and previous empirical findings to 
motivate the control variables in our system of equations (1). In particular, we attempt to 
incorporate the incentives of three important sets of actors: shareholders, managers and potential 
plaintiffs in affecting the endogenous variables in the system. 
 Implicit in our hypothesis is the notion that operating lawsuits arise because some 
managers are willing to push the limits of the law to create value for shareholders. The benefits 
of this litigation exposure for managers do not come from lawsuits per se, but from firm policies 
underlying the litigation risk. However, being sued increases the probability of managers losing 
their jobs (see, e.g., Aharony, Liu and Yawson (2015)). So, everything else the same, this 
propensity to be sued should be negatively correlated with the cost of losing the job, which we 
proxy with the CEO’s total compensation (similar to Gow, Larcker and Reiss (2016)). So for the 
Operating Lawsuits equation, the CEO’s total compensation serves as an identifying variable 
because it is less important for other endogenous variables in the system. For plaintiffs, the 
expected benefit of suing a firm should exceed the expected costs. Suing larger, more profitable 
firms with deep pockets offers greater benefit for the potential plaintiffs. For industry rivals, the 
benefits of winning lawsuits are likely also greater in markets with high competition. So, we 
control for asset size, profitability, cash holding and product market concentration (the inverse of 
competition using the Hoberg and Phillips (2016) text-based measure).20  
                                                     
20 From the Hoberg and Phillips (2016) website, we obtain data on firms' exposure to product competition based on 
how similar a firm's products are to other firms. Hoberg and Phillips derive this ‘total similarity’ measure based on 
how firms describe their products and services in the mandatory product description section of 10-K filings. The 
authors show that this classification does a better job of identifying the degree of competition and rivals than 
traditional industry classifications. 
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 Investment in R&D is risky and offers a positively skewed payoff. Prior literature 
shows that it is a function of managerial ownership (e.g., delta) and the sensitivity of managerial 
compensation to risk (vega; see, e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006)). Shareholders are much 
more likely to welcome R&D in companies with higher growth opportunities. So, managerial 
ownership, vega and growth opportunities (lagged market-to-book ratio) serve as the identifying 
variables in this regression. Moreover, prior literature shows that product market competition 
affects the incentive to invest in R&D and the valuation of R&D (see, e.g., Aghion et al. (2005), 
Gu (2016)). Firms that compete in areas with more homogeneous products are forced to invest 
more in R&D for differentiation. So, we control for product similarity and product market 
concentration using the text-based measure of Hoberg and Phillips (2016). On the other hand, 
agency theory predicts that large discretionary cash holdings encourage, and debt discourages, 
managers to overinvest. Therefore, following Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009), we control for 
cash holdings and financial leverage in the Excess R&D regression. 
 Control variables for advertising intensity include gross margin, because a higher 
margin leaves room to spend more on advertising and promotion. The marginal benefit of a 
dollar of advertising expense is likely to be higher for firms with higher sales volume, so we 
control for the volume of past sales. So these two variables serve as identifying variables in this 
regression. Product market competition and product similarity among competitors likely affect 
the optimal level of advertising, so we control for both variables using Hoberg and Phillips’ 
(2016) text-based measures.  
 Operating lawsuits largely arise from a firm’s interactions with its various stakeholders: 
employees, suppliers, customers, competitors, and the larger community. It is plausible that firms 
can benefit their shareholders by disregarding other stakeholders’ welfare and profiting from 
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negative externalities. But managers derive utility from their reputation among key stakeholders, 
including the broader community, and one important way they build reputation is by caring 
about environmental and social issues. However, the importance of such issues varies across 
individuals and communities. For example, Democrats tend to care more about CSR than 
Republicans, so firms in Democrat-leaning states tend to spend more on CSR than those in 
Republican-leaning states, even though CSR spending decreases future profitability (see Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky (2014)). Local stakeholders’ education level and awareness also plausibly 
influence a firm’s involvement in CSR. So a firm’s location is one of the most important 
determinants of its involvement in CSR. Because location-level characteristics tend to be stable 
over time but vary in the cross-section, we control for state fixed effects using the location of a 
firm’s headquarters. Moreover, CSR concerns are likely affected by how much the firm has 
invested in the community, which we control by CSR strengths in the same regression. These 
variables serve as our identifying variables in the regression of CSR concerns.  
 The final dependent variable of interest is firm valuation, defined as the natural log of 
Tobin’s Q. Our main explanatory variables of interest are various firm policies we considered 
earlier and the number of operating lawsuits. The regression of Tobin’s Q controls for several 
factors known to affect firm valuation and includes industry fixed effects (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, 
Low and Teoh (2012). A firm’s market share, the number of business segments and the number 
of securities lawsuits are well-known predictors of firm valuation, and serve as identifying 
variables in this regression. 
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4.3 Results and discussion 
 Table 8 presents the results of the system of regressions (1). Columns 1 to 5 present 
structural parameters, and columns 6 to 10 present the corresponding reduced form parameters 
estimated from the system. Simply put, a structural parameter represents the direct effect of an 
explanatory variable on an endogenous variable. On the other hand, a reduced form parameter 
represents the total effect of an explanatory variable - the sum of both direct and indirect effects - 
on an endogenous variable. In other words, a reduced-form parameter is the estimate of the 
change in an endogenous variable after accounting for all simultaneity in the system. For 
structural regressions, we also present the predicted signs of the parameters based on previous 
theoretical and empirical findings. However, we make no prediction about the signs of the 
reduced-form parameters because they can be a function of multiple variables. As we will 
discuss later, comparison of structural parameters to reduced form parameters helps us make 
inferences about the channel(s) through which one variable in the system affects others. As 
Wooldridge (2002, pp. 225) points out, if the structural model is correctly specified and at least 
one equation is over-identified, we obtain asymptotically more efficient estimators of the 
reduced form parameters by deriving the estimates from the structural parameter estimates.  
 We estimate the system of equations (1) using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
method, which allows each regression in the system to affect each other by variables or by error 
terms correlated across the equations. In Panel A, column 1, where the dependent variable is 
Operating Lawsuits, each of our three main variables of interest - Excess R&D, Advtg. Intensity 
and CSR Concerns - positively predicts the number of operating lawsuits. This finding is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the process of developing and promoting new products can 
intensify rivalry with competitors; aggressive advertising can put a spotlight on a firm’s relations 
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with other stakeholders; and actions that solely benefit shareholders can create negative 
externalities (measured by CSR concerns) that encroach on the welfare of non-financial 
stakeholders and the broader community, some of which can lead to lawsuits against the firm.  
 Notably, the coefficient of Female Execs ≥ 2, even though negative, is insignificant in 
predicting lawsuits. This result suggests that the power of female executives per se does not 
affect operating lawsuits. In the system of equations (1), and the causal path in Figure 1, the 
estimated l1 is not different from zero. However, our main interest in this study is whether female 
executives’ power in management affects lawsuits via their policies (combination of parameters: 
l3, r1, l4, a1, l5, and c1), which we will shortly assess via reduced-form parameters. Most control 
variables take predicted signs. For example, larger firms, and firms in less concentrated (more 
competitive) markets face more lawsuits. CEOs’ total compensation (cost of being fired due to 
lawsuits) is negatively related to lawsuits. Excess Capex is positively, and Excess Acquis is 
negatively, related to lawsuits, although the latter is statistically insignificant.21  
 The next question is whether and how female executives influence these lawsuit-prone 
policies (i.e., Excess R&D, Advtg. Intensity and CSR Concerns). The second column shows the 
structural parameters related to Excess R&D as the dependent variable. Here, consistent with our 
hypothesis, the variable Female Execs ≥ 2 obtains a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in predicting excess R&D. The coefficient of -0.005 implies that a firm with two or 
more female executives is associated with -0.005 less Excess R&D ratio, which is a decrease of 
about 9% of this variable’s standard deviation (0.005/0.057). This result is consistent with prior 
studies that find that female managers, who tend to more risk-averse, undertake fewer risky 
investments compared to their male counterparts and achieve slower growth (see, e.g., Huang 
                                                     
21 Excess Capex also turns insignificant in the corresponding reduced form estimate in column 6. 
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and Kisgen (2013)). Key control variables mostly take expected signs. For instance, excess R&D 
is positively affected by growth opportunities (lag Q) and managers’ incentive to increase risk 
(Managers' Avg. Vega). It is negatively associated with the concentration of managers’ wealth in 
the firm (i.e., portfolio under-diversification), measured by Managerial Ownership. Consistent 
with the free cash flow hypothesis of overinvestment, cash holding (leverage) positively 
(negatively) predicts excess R&D. 
 Column 3 shows that greater power of female executives negatively predicts advertising 
intensity. The point estimate of Female Execs ≥ 2 is substantial, although the coefficient just 
misses the 10% level of statistical significance in the structural estimation (but it is significant in 
the reduced-form estimation in column 8). The point estimate suggests that a firm with two or 
more female top executives spends .003 less on advertising as a fraction of total revenue, which 
is a decrease of about 13% of this variable’s standard deviation. Important control variables 
generally take expected signs. For instance, firms with higher gross margins, higher sales and 
more cash holdings spend more on advertising. 
 In column 4, we find that greater power of women managers significantly and 
negatively predicts CSR Concerns. We also find that the presence of even one woman on the 
management team negatively predicts such concerns, although the magnitude is larger for firms 
with multiple female executives (Female Execs ≥ 2). Firms that are larger, older, and in more 
concentrated industries have more CSR concerns, while firms with a female independent director 
have fewer concerns. 
 So far, our system estimates reveal that firms where female executives have more 
power spend less on R&D, have lower advertising intensity and adopt less controversial business 
practices, reflected in fewer CSR concerns. Each of these policies leads a firm to face more 
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operating lawsuits. The last equation in the system reveals how each of these policies influences 
firm valuation. Column 5 presents estimates of structural parameters in the firm valuation 
regression. As hypothesized, we find that Excess R&D and Advtg. Intensity both predict firm 
valuation positively. These results are consistent with prior papers that study R&D and 
advertising policies separately (e.g., Chauvin and Hirschey (1993), and Joshi and Hanssens 
(2010)). We find that their results hold in our much larger sample and in a model that allows for 
simultaneous decisions on these policies. In column 5, CSR Concerns also predict firm valuation 
positively, consistent with rent extraction by shareholders at the cost of other stakeholders. 
Although the issue of whether CSR spending is good or bad for firm valuation is highly debated 
in the literature, our findings are generally consistent with those of Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 
(2014) and Chen, Hung and Wang (2018), who find that better CSR ratings generally come at a 
cost to shareholders. In sum, we find that all three policies are litigation-prone but, on average, 
value-enhancing.  
 Interestingly, the system estimates that the direct effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on Tobin’s 
Q is positive even though it just misses statistical significance. This result suggests that after 
controlling for many important value-relevant policy differences, the presence of multiple female 
executives is somewhat positively associated with firm valuation. This pure positive association 
between multiple female executives and valuation can be due to two factors: 1) omitted variables 
in the system related to value-enhancing policies pursued by female executives,22 and 2) 
matching of female executives to firms with higher valuations. But our main interest here is not 
in this pure (or residual) effect or even in the total effect of female executives on firm valuation, 
                                                     
22 For instance, some previous studies have found that female CFOs are associated with less expensive bank loans 
and better quality of financial reporting (see Francis, Hasan and Wu (2013)).  
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but on their indirect effects via corporate policies, which requires carefully analyzing the reduced 
form parameters.  
  Columns 6 through 10 present estimates of the reduced form parameters of the system, 
which, approximately, are estimates of the total effect of each exogenous variable on the 
endogenous variables. In column 6, the reduced form coefficient of Female Execs ≥ 2 in 
predicting operating lawsuits is -0.187, which is significant at the 1% level. This effect 
approximately equals the sum of 1) the direct effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on lawsuits, and 2) its 
indirect effect, which equals the sum of the product of the effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on 
different policies (Excess R&D, advertising intensity, CSR concerns) and the effects of these 
policies on lawsuits. Using the structural parameters from columns 1 to 4, we can obtain an 
approximate reduced form coefficient as r1×l3+ a1×l4 + c1×l5 + l1 = -0.153 (= -0.005×5.460 - 
0.003×12.715 - 0.203×0.402 - 0.006).23,24 Because the direct effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on 
lawsuits, obtained from the structural equations (l1), is negligible, nearly all of the effect of 
Female Execs ≥ 2 on lawsuits can be attributed to firm policy channels. 
 Columns 7, 8 and 9, present estimates of the reduced form regressions of the three 
corporate policy variables. The coefficient estimates on Female Execs ≥ 2 in predicting these 
policy variables are comparable to those obtained from structural models. The effect on Advtg. 
                                                     
23 In an accurately specified system that is exactly identified (i.e., it has equal number of structural and reduced form 
parameters), reduced form parameters can be obtained precisely by solving the structural parameters, and vice versa. 
However, our system is over-identified, i.e. we have fewer structural parameters than reduced-form parameters. 
Having multiple instruments is generally desirable for identification. But in an over-identified system, each 
structural parameter can be recovered by more than one nonlinear combination of the reduced-form parameters. So, 
the structural parameters are obtained by the ‘best fit’ of the reduced form parameters. 
 
24 This estimate is almost identical to that from the untabulated firm fixed effects model (-0.152). It is not directly 
comparable to estimates from negative binomial models (in Table 3), which assume a different data-generating 
process and in which the marginal effect depends on the point of the variables’ distribution (e.g., mean, median or 
percentile) at which the effect is estimated. 
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Intensity here turns statistically significant at the 10% level. Structural regressions of the three 
policy variables do not have any endogenous explanatory variables, so there should not be much 
difference between reduced-form and structural parameters (because there is no ‘indirect effect’). 
The difference arises in an over-identified system because of the correlation of these endogenous 
variables to all exogenous variables in the entire system. 
 Perhaps the most interesting result comes from reduced form estimates of the firm 
valuation (Ln(Tobin’s Q) regression. Strikingly, the reduced form estimate of Female Execs ≥ 2 
in predicting Ln(Tobin’s Q) is -0.029, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
estimate represents the sum of the direct effect of female executives and its indirect effect via 
firm policies. Similar to the lawsuit regression, we can obtain an approximate total effect of 
Female Execs ≥ 2 on firm valuation by taking the sum of the product of the structural parameters 
as follows: l1×m6 + r1×m3 + a1×m4 + c1×m5+ m1 = -0.030 (= -0.006×0.053 - 0.005×7.966 - 
0.003×5.679 - 0.203×0.075 + 0.042).25 Next, the loss of valuation attributable to litigation-prone 
firm policies (indirect effect) can be obtained by subtracting the direct effects from the total 
effects, as follows: - 0.030 – 0.042 = -0.072. Alternatively, using the reduced-form estimate as 
the total effect, the estimated indirect effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 due to the differences in firm 
policies is -0.071 (= -0.029 - 0.042). Thus, our estimates suggest that multiple female executives 
have an indirect effect of about -7% from avoiding litigation-prone firm policies, and a total 
effect of about -3%. Interestingly, the total effects of a single female executive on both lawsuits26 
and Q, estimated in reduced form equations, are also negative and statistically significant, 
                                                     
25  Once again, the total is not exactly -0.029 because the system is over-identified, but it is very close. 
26 The corresponding coefficient in the fixed effects model (Table 5) is also negative, though statistically 
insignificant. The reduced form model controls for all the exogenous variables that appear in any equation in the 
simultaneous equations system. So it includes a lot more controls than the fixed effects model. The estimates from 
the reduced form model are not comparable to those from the negative binomial model in Table 3 because the latter 
assumes a different data-generating process. 
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although their magnitudes are much smaller compared to those of multiple women executives. 
Importantly, the estimated effect of multiple women executives on value through litigation-
prone policies (-7%) is several times larger than the corresponding effect of a single female 
executive (-1.7%).27 Finally, as expected, securities lawsuits have significantly negative effects 
on valuation in both system and reduced form estimates. 
  
4.4 Information content of operating lawsuits 
 Our system estimates yield a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
operating lawsuits (m6) in predicting firm valuation, which is consistent with our conjecture that 
some lawsuits are a symptom of risky but value-enhancing firm policies. However, the structural 
estimate is the direct (residual) effect of litigation risk on firm value after controlling for the 
relevant corporate policies. The positive estimate of m6 may represent other omitted firm policy 
variables that we do not consider in the system. However, our question is whether the link 
between lawsuits and value comes from our three underlying policies, which is not obvious from 
the system. We now address this issue. The structural regression of Q controls for all three 
endogenous firm policies related to lawsuits. Consistent with the notion that operating lawsuits 
largely stem from these risky firm policies, it is plausible that these policies subsume the main 
coefficient of lawsuits. We test this possibility by omitting all three endogenous policy variables 
from the Tobin’s Q regression, and let other variables subsume the effects of these omitted 
variables. This test is similar in spirit to the ‘with-and-without-controls’ approach used by 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).  
                                                     
27 The effect of a single female executive on value through firm policies can be estimated as follows: r2×m3 + a2×m4 
+ c2×m5 = -0.003*0.7996-0.001*5.679-0.124*0.075 = -0.017. This value equals the total effect estimated by the 
reduced form parameter in column 10. This is because the direct effect estimated in column 5 is small and far from 
being statistically significant. 
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 Panel B of Table 8 shows estimates of the system of equations that is identical to that in 
panel A, except that the Tobin’s Q regression does not include the three policy variables. As 
shown in Column 5, the coefficient estimate on operating lawsuits increases to 0.168 from 0.053 
and becomes highly significant (t-statistic = 7.86) in predicting firm valuation. This result is 
consistent with our conjecture that the underlying firm policies produce the positive relation 
between operating lawsuits and firm valuation. The size and significance of all other variables in 
the structural and reduced-form regressions remain almost the same. Also noticeable is the fact 
that the direct effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 turns from positive to negative and insignificant, 
highlighting the influence of Female Execs ≥ 2 on the three underlying firm policies.28 Using this 
system, an approximate total effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on firm valuation can be obtained as the 
product of the total effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 on operating lawsuits (from the reduced form 
estimate in column (6)), and the effect of operating lawsuits on valuation, -0.187×0.168 = -0.031, 
which is comparable to the reduced form parameter of -0.029. 
 In sum, our battery of tests suggests that the negative effect of women’s power in 
management is at least partially driven by women managers’ preference to avoid some risky and 
litigation-prone firm policies that are generally value-increasing. We identify three such policies: 
less aggressive R&D, less advertising and avoidance of policies inimical to other stakeholders.  
 
4.5 Self-selection: Treatment effect model 
 Our analysis so far in this section suggests that firms where female executives have 
more power have lower levels of R&D, advertising intensity and CSR concerns. Together, these 
                                                     
28 Note that even in this setting, we do not necessarily expect the structural coefficient of Female Execs ≥ 2 to be 
significantly negative in predicting value. Our interest is not in the direct effect of women executives’ power on firm 
valuation, but rather their indirect effect via litigation-prone underlying policies, which is shown by the reduced-
form models. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627846 
39 
 
conservative policies reduce the chance of operating lawsuits against firms, but also lead to 
lower firm valuation. These findings are consistent with findings of the prior literature that 
women executives cause firms to adopt lower-risk policies. But it is also possible that risk-averse 
women choose to work for firms that try to avoid lawsuits. The lack of a strong exogenous shock 
to female executive positions (particularly those affecting Female Execs ≥ 2 only) makes it 
difficult to establish that female executives cause this difference in policies. So our findings may 
partly reflect female executives choosing to work for firms with a risk-averse culture that gives 
rise to fewer lawsuits and lower firm values. This interpretation is still consistent with women 
executives’ greater risk-aversion.29  
 Nevertheless, we next analyze whether our results hold after explicitly correcting for 
such self-selection via treatment effect models. To improve identification, our selection models 
include an instrumental variable for the presence of multiple female executives in the top 
management team. To construct our instrument, we follow previous studies (see, e.g., Adams 
and Ferreira (2009), and Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016)) and calculate the fraction of male 
directors on a firm’s board who are on the boards of other companies that have females among 
their top five executives (Male Dir. w/ Fem. Exec. Link). The rationale behind this instrument is that 
male directors are likely more comfortable hiring women in top positions if they have experience 
working with women in senior executive positions in other companies on whose boards they 
serve. Supporting this notion, this variable positively predicts Female Execs ≥ 2 in first-stage 
(selection) regressions shown in Panel B of Table 10, but it is plausibly exogenous to litigation-
prone firm policies. The selection models control for other variables like those used by Adams 
                                                     
29 Our simultaneous equations system allows for both possibilities. An alternative specification would add a 
regression of female executives’ power (Female Execs ≥ 2) as an endogenous variable in the system to try to 
establish causality. We refrain from using this approach to keep the system tractable. A misspecification in one 
equation in a simultaneous equations system contaminates the entire system, and the problem gets worse the larger 
the number of equations in the system. 
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and Ferreira (2009) and the lagged dependent variable to predict the presence of female 
executives. Both stages of these models are estimated simultaneously by the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  
 In Panel A of Table 9, female executives’ power (Female Execs ≥ 2) continues to 
negatively and significantly predict operating lawsuits and all three firm policies, namely excess 
R&D, Advtg. intensity and CSR concerns. These results suggest that the observed relations 
between female executives’ power and firm policies are not entirely driven by self-selection. The 
p-value of the Wald test of independent equations, shown at the bottom of Panel B, is below 0.01 
in models of firm policies (models 2 through 4), suggesting that selection effects are also 
important for firm policy choices. Together, these results support both a selection effect of 
women choosing to work for firms with a lower risk-taking culture and a treatment effect of 
women choosing lower-risk policies that invite fewer lawsuits.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 We examine whether managerial risk-aversion affects lawsuits against firms. We use 
two measures of women’s power in the top executive team as proxies for managerial risk 
aversion, and find that women’s power negatively predicts operating lawsuits against firms. 
Results from a simultaneous equations framework suggest that these lawsuits are a function of 
risky firm policies that are value-increasing. Firms where women have more power appear to 
reduce litigation risk partly by avoiding such policies. Finally, we find some evidence of both a 
selection effect of women choosing to work for firms with a lower risk-taking culture and a 
treatment effect of women choosing lower-risk policies that invite fewer lawsuits. Our evidence 
that some litigation-prone firm policies are value-enhancing helps explain why lawsuits against 
firms are so prevalent despite their apparent negative impacts on shareholders and managers 
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upon filing. As a first comprehensive study of non-securities lawsuits, the paper faces some 
challenges of data limitations, which opens up opportunities for future research. One fruitful area 
seems to be whether management and board structures (including women’s power) are 
influenced by a firm’s exposure to lawsuits. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions 
All Lawsuits Number of all lawsuits filed in a given year in which the firm is mentioned as a defendant: From 
Legal Case and Legal Parties of Audit Analytics 
Operating Lawsuits Number of all lawsuits not related to securities laws (IS_CATEGORY_TYPE_41) filed in a given 
year in which the firm is mentioned as a defendant: From Legal Case And Legal Parties of Audit 
Analytics 
Securities Lawsuits Number of all lawsuits related to Securities Law (IS_CATEGORY_TYPE_41) filed in a given year in 
which the firm is mentioned as a defendant: From Legal Case And Legal Parties of Audit Analytics 
Female Exec. Indicator An indicator variable which = 1 if a firm has at least one female executive in its top management 
team, 0 otherwise: From Execucomp 
Female Execs ≥ 2 An indicator variable which = 1 if a firm has two or more female executives in its top management 
team, 0 otherwise: From Execucomp 
Female Execs=1 An indicator variable which = 1 if a firm has exactly one female executive in its top management 
team, 0 otherwise: From Execucomp 
Female Exec. Pay Slice The sum of all female executives’ total compensation (TDC2), divided by the sum of all executives’ 
total compensation.: From Execucomp 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator An indicator variable which = 1 if a firm has at least one female independent director on the board, 0 
otherwise: From ISS (RiskMetrics) 
Board Independence Fraction of independent directors on the board: From ISS (RiskMetrics) 
Ln(Total Assets) Natural log of Total Assets: From Compustat 
Firm Age Firm age from its first appearance on the Compustat database 
Stock Return Stock return for the year: From CRSP 
Stock Volatility Natural log of the variance of daily stock returns for the year 
Cash to Assets Cash and marketable securities divided by total assets: From Compustat 
ROA Return on assets = Net Income/Total Assets: From Compustat 
Book Leverage Short term plus long term debt divided by total assets: From Compustat 
Ln(Tobin's Q) Natural log of  (Book value of total assets + Market value of equity - Book value of equity) / Book 
value of total assets (Compustat: at - ceq + csho*prcc_f - txditc)/at 
# Settlement Number of all lawsuits filed in a given year against the firm with settlement dollars 
(settlement_dollars) >0: From Legal Case And Legal Parties of Audit Analytics 
$ Settlement Sum of settlement dollars for the lawsuits filed in a given year against the firm: From Legal Case 
And Legal Parties of Audit Analytics 
CSR Concerns  
The sum of concerns related to environment, community, employment, diversity, product and 
human rights: From KLD (now MSCI) 
CSR Strengths The sum of strengths on the above categories: From KLD (now MSCI) 
# Business Segments Number of business segments: From Compustat 
Excess R&D/Excess 
Capex/Excess Aquis. 
Excess R&Di,t or Capexi,t  or Aquisi,t  = Actual  - Predicted (R&Di,t or Capexi,t or Aquisi,t), 
where predicted values are obtained from the following equations estimated for each Fama-French 
48 industry-year: 
 R&Di,t or Capexi,t  or Aquisi,t  = β0 + β1 * Sales Growthi,t-1 + εi,t 
Sales Growtht-1 is the percentage change in sales from t-2 to t-1.  
Advtg. Intensity Advertising expense divided by sales. Advertising expense is replaced by zero when missing. From 
Compustat 
Ln(Total Compensation) Natural log of total compensation (TDC2): From Execucomp 
Market Concentration 
Market concentration based on the product description sections of firms’ 10-K filings (TNIC3HHI): 
Hoberg and Phillips (2016) data library 
Managers' Avg. Vega The average Vega of top 5 executives’ compensation 
Managerial Ownership Total shares owned by top 5 executives divided by the number of shares outstanding 
Gross Margin Sales minus cost of goods sold, divided by sales: From Compustat 
Product Similarity 
A measure of similarity of a firm’s products to those of the competitors based on the product 
description section of 10-K filings (TNIC3TSIMM): Hoberg and Phillips (2016) data library 
Ln(Market Share) 
Natural log of market share, calculated as the ratio of a firm’s sales to total Fama-French 48 industry 
sales 
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Table 1: Distribution of female executives and directors 
 
Lawsuits per year 
All Lawsuits Freq. Operating  Freq. Securities  Freq. 
0 5,823 0 5,998 0 8,020
1 1,471 1 1,396 1 307
2 527 2 487 2 39
3 223 3 204 3 10
4 128 4 113 4 4
5 70 5 64 5 1
6 35 6 30 6 2
7 25 7 24 7 1
8 23 8 21 8 1
9 18 9 15 9 1
≥ 10 45 ≥ 10 36 ≥ 10 2
  
Executives 
No. of Female Execs Freq. 
0 5,922 
1 1,918 
2 446 
3 84 
4 14 
5 4 
Female Execs=1 Freq. 
0 6,470 
1 1,918 
Female Execs ≥ 2 Freq. 
0 7,840 
1 548 
Independent Directors 
Female Ind Dir Count Freq. 
0 2,869 
1 3,048 
2 1,460 
3 294 
4 67 
5 6 
6 1 
Female Ind Dir =1 Freq. 
0 4,697 
1 3,048 
Female Ind Dir ≥ 2 Freq. 
0 5,917 
1 1,828 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and correlations 
Panel A of this table presents summary statistics of the variables in our analysis. Panel B 
presents pairwise Pearson correlations among some key variables of interest. In panel B, all 
boldfaced coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level or better. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
All Lawsuits 8341 0.61 1.55 0 0 0 1 2 
Securities Lawsuits 8341 0.06 0.45 0 0 0 0 0 
Operating Lawsuits 8341 0.55 1.44 0 0 0 1 2 
Female Execs ≥ 2 8341 0.07 0.25 
Female Execs=1 8341 0.23 0.42 
Female Exec. Pay Slice 8341 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.18 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator 8341 0.60 0.49 
Excess R&D  8341 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.06 
Excess Capex 8341 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.05 
Excess Aquis. 8341 0.00 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 
Advtg. Intensity  8341 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
CSR Concerns 7440 1.78 1.95 0 0 1 2 4 
Board Independence 8341 0.71 0.15 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.83 0.89 
Ln(Total Assets) 8341 7.48 1.49 5.68 6.42 7.33 8.39 9.57 
Firm Age 8341 26.13 16.14 8.00 12.00 21.00 40.00 52.00 
Stock Return 8341 0.02 0.45 -0.52 -0.19 0.07 0.29 0.51 
Stock Volatility 8341 -7.34 0.89 -8.46 -7.96 -7.40 -6.76 -6.14 
ROA 8341 0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.13 
Cash to Assets 8341 0.28 0.58 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.31 0.69 
Ln(Total Compensation) 8294 8.05 1.17 6.72 7.35 8.09 8.77 9.40 
Market Concentration 8300 0.23 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.29 0.48 
Book Leverage 8341 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.31 0.42 
Managers' Avg. Vega (in $000) 8225 73.56 125.37 4.96 13.33 33.49 80.84 178.38 
Managerial Ownership (× 1000) 8341 32.89 67.82 0.95 2.74 7.99 23.90 92.73 
Ln(Sales) 8341 7.41 1.55 5.54 6.37 7.29 8.38 9.53 
Gross Margin 8337 0.40 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.37 0.53 0.70 
Product Similarity 8300 2.98 3.17 1.08 1.25 1.81 3.37 5.99 
CSR Strengths 7440 1.81 2.65 0 0 1 2 5 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) 8341 0.52 0.46 0.00 0.18 0.44 0.78 1.14 
Ln(Market Share) 8341 -4.80 1.76 -7.06 -6.11 -4.84 -3.52 -2.41 
# Business Segments 8341 2.61 1.60 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
# Settlement 2874 0.12 0.37 0 0 0 0 1.00 
Ln($ Settlement) 2874 1.74 5.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.74 
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Panel B: Pearson correlations among key variables of interest 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
All Lawsuits (1) 1
Securities Lawsuits (2) 0.38 1
Operating Lawsuits (3) 0.96 0.09 1
Female Execs ≥ 2 (4) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1
Female Execs=1 (5) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.15 1
Female Exec. Pay Slice (6) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.38 1
Female Indep. Dir. Indicato (7) 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.07 1
Excess R&D (8) 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 1
Excess Capex (9) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 1
Excess Aquis (10) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.01 1
Advtg. Intensity (11) 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1
CSR Concerns (12) 0.26 0.03 0.27 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 1
Board Independence (13) 0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.29 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 1
Ln(Total Assets) (14) 0.35 0.07 0.35 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.38 -0.21 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.54 0.18 1
Firm Age (15) 0.13 0.00 0.14 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.29 -0.16 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.36 0.21 0.42 1
Stock Return (16) 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 1
Stock Volatility (17) -0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.25 0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 -0.39 -0.27 -0.26 1
ROA (18) 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.24 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.29 -0.34 1
Cash to Assets (19) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.40 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.25 -0.18 0.01 0.17 -0.12 1
Ln(Total Compensation) (20) 0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.27 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.29 0.18 0.59 0.24 0.02 -0.25 0.10 -0.10 1
Market Concentration (21) -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 1
Book Leverage (22) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.28 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 -0.13 -0.18 0.14 0.02 1
Managers' Avg. Vega (23) 0.28 0.09 0.28 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.13 0.24 0.04 0.53 0.18 0.03 -0.27 0.10 -0.04 0.43 -0.07 0.02 1
Managerial Ownership (24) -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.10 -0.30 -0.19 -0.14 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.24 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 1
Lag(Q) (25) 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.28 0.11 0.06 0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.12 -0.17 0.31 -0.19 0.21 0.23 0.06 -0.01 -0.24 0.17 0.05 1
Ln(Sales) (26) 0.32 0.06 0.33 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.43 -0.31 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.53 0.17 0.92 0.45 0.03 -0.40 0.21 -0.35 0.54 -0.04 0.21 0.46 -0.14 -0.10 1
Gross Margin (27) 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.21 -0.16 0.02 -0.07 -0.19 0.03 -0.05 0.15 0.13 0.05 -0.06 -0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.37 -0.22 1
Product Similarity (28) 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.43 0.09 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 0.13 -0.12 0.36 0.04 -0.34 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.14 -0.19 0.25 1
CSR Strengths (29) 0.33 0.07 0.33 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.32 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.39 0.20 0.58 0.33 -0.02 -0.21 0.06 -0.06 0.32 -0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.14 0.08 0.55 0.08 -0.02 1
Ln(Tobin’s Q) (30) 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.27 0.06 -0.03 0.10 -0.13 -0.03 -0.13 -0.14 0.18 -0.11 0.14 0.22 0.03 0.00 -0.20 0.14 0.05 0.82 -0.11 0.33 0.12 0.06 1
Ln(Market Share) (31) 0.23 0.04 0.23 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.36 -0.28 -0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.42 0.13 0.73 0.42 0.04 -0.36 0.18 -0.34 0.44 0.00 0.26 0.37 -0.13 -0.09 0.78 -0.21 -0.27 0.44 -0.09 1
# Business Segments (32) 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.13 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.33 0.03 -0.17 0.04 -0.17 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.12 -0.07 -0.14 0.29 -0.16 -0.20 0.17 -0.12 0.32 1
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Table 3: Analysis of levels: Negative binomial models of the number of securities and operating 
lawsuits filed against firms 
The table presents negative binomial models of the number of lawsuits filed against a firm in 
year (t+1) on variables measuring the power of women executives in the top management team 
and control variables in year t. The sample consists of firms included in both Execucomp and 
Audit Analytics databases over the years 2002 to 2011. All the variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The power of women executives is measured using the number of female executives 
in panel A and female executives’ pay slice in panel B. In both Panels, model (1) is for all 
lawsuits, (2) is for operating lawsuits and (3) is for securities lawsuits. All the models include 
year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered within a firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Using the number of female executives 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
Lawsuitst+1 
Operating  
Lawsuitst+1 
Securities 
Lawsuitst+1 
Female Execs ≥ 2 -0.212** -0.258*** 0.246 
(-2.28) (-2.65) (1.01) 
Female Execs=1 0.019 0.004 0.122 
(0.28) (0.05) (0.79) 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator 0.001 0.043 -0.273* 
(0.02) (0.58) (-1.85) 
Board Independence 0.282 0.342 -0.065 
 (1.29) (1.49) (-0.15) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.586*** 0.595*** 0.492*** 
(22.99) (22.25) (8.99) 
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 -0.004 
(0.76) (0.92) (-0.79) 
Stock Return -0.150** -0.041 -0.788*** 
(-2.47) (-0.63) (-5.13) 
Stock Volatility 0.167*** 0.134*** 0.425*** 
 (3.49) (2.76) (4.12) 
ROA 0.177 0.141 0.562 
(0.85) (0.63) (1.40) 
Cash to Assets 0.102* 0.095 0.108 
(1.72) (1.59) (1.27) 
Book Leverage -0.825*** -0.920*** -0.033 
(-4.29) (-4.66) (-0.07) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 8341 8341 8341 
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.136 0.091 
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Panel B: Using female executives’ pay slice 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Lawsuitst+1 
Operating  
Lawsuitst+1 
Securities 
Lawsuitst+1 
Female Exec. Pay Slice -0.539** -0.578** -0.056 
(-2.42) (-2.45) (-0.11) 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator -0.002 0.039 -0.264* 
(-0.03) (0.52) (-1.78) 
Board Independence 0.298 0.357 -0.057 
 (1.36) (1.56) (-0.13) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.584*** 0.594*** 0.487*** 
(22.86) (22.13) (8.82) 
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 -0.004 
(0.79) (0.95) (-0.76) 
Stock Return -0.150** -0.041 -0.786*** 
(-2.48) (-0.63) (-5.15) 
Stock Volatility 0.168*** 0.135*** 0.428*** 
 (3.53) (2.78) (4.15) 
ROA 0.171 0.133 0.568 
(0.83) (0.60) (1.41) 
Cash to Assets 0.101* 0.095 0.104 
(1.72) (1.59) (1.23) 
Book Leverage -0.822*** -0.918*** -0.009 
(-4.26) (-4.64) (-0.02) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 8341 8341 8341 
Pseudo R2 0.128  0.136  0.091 
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Table 4: Effect of Female Execs ≥ 2 among nearest neighbor matched sample 
The table presents the results of a nearest neighborhood matched treatment effects model. For 
each treated firm (Female Execs ≥ 2), we find up to two control firms in the same year, Fama-
French 48 industry and the presence or absence of a female independent director that do not have 
Female Execs ≥ 2 and have the minimum Mahalanobis distance based on the continuous 
variables listed below the table. Firms are matched one year prior to the lawsuit filing year. The 
Mahalanobis distance between two firms j and k is given byට൫࢞௝ െ ࢞௞൯ᇱ ௫ܹି ଵሺ࢞௝ െ ࢞௞ሻ , where 
࢞ is a vector of covariates and ܹ is the variance-covariance matrix of the covariates. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Operating Lawsuitst+1 Coef. z N 
Avg. Treatment Effect (ATE): 
Female Execs ≥ 2       
 
-.236*** 
 
-3.76   
 
1,728 
 
Matching variables:  
   Exact: Year, Fama-French 48 industry, Female Indep. Dir. 
               Indicator 
   Nearest neighbor: Ln(Total Assets), Firm Age, Stock Return, 
                Stock  volatility, ROA 
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Table 5: Change analysis: Regressions of changes in the number of lawsuits against a firm on 
changes in the number of female executives 
 
The table presents OLS regressions of the percentage change in the number of lawsuits filed 
against a firm in year (t+1) from year t on changes in the number of female executives in year t 
from year t-1and in year t-1 from year t-2, and changes in control variables in year t from year t-
1. %Δ denotes the first difference in the natural log of one plus the number of respective 
lawsuits. Models (1) to (3) are for changes in operating lawsuits: (1) is for the full sample, (2) is 
for the sub-sample of firm-years with non-zero changes in these lawsuits, and (3) is for the sub-
sample of firm-years with non-zero changes in the number of female executives. Models (4) and 
(5), (6) are defined similarly for securities lawsuits. The sample consists of firms included in 
both Execucomp and Audit Analytics databases from the years 2002 to 2011. The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. All models include Fama-French 48 industry and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered within a firm, and t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
%Δ 
Operating 
Lawsuitst+1 
%Δ 
Operating
Lawsuitst+1
(Given 
Δ≠0) 
%Δ 
Operating 
Lawsuitst+1 
(Given 
ΔFemExec≠0) 
%Δ 
Securities
Lawsuitst+1 
%ΔSecurities
Lawsuitst+1 
(Given 
Δ≠0) 
%ΔSecurities
Lawsuitst+1 
(Given 
ΔFemExec≠0)
Δ(Female Execs ≥ 2) -0.074** -0.243** -0.243** -0.006 -0.123 -0.008 
(-2.20) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.36) 
Δ(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1 -0.033 -0.096 -0.096 0.006 -0.045 -0.001 
(-0.86) (-0.92) (-0.92) (0.25) (-0.15) (-0.03) 
ΔFemale Indep. Dir.  0.015 0.076 0.076 -0.013 -0.274 -0.027 
Indicator (0.52) (0.96) (0.96) (-1.10) (-1.61) (-0.63) 
       
Δ Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5286 1888 1888 5286 380 536 
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Table 6: Do past changes in lawsuits predict changes in women executives’ power? 
Columns (1) to (3) of the table present OLS regressions of variables measuring changes in the 
power of women executives in the top management team in year (t+1) from year t on the 
percentage change in the number of lawsuits filed against a firm and control variables in year t 
from year t-1. Column (3) is for the sub-sample of firm-years with non-zero changes in the 
number of operating lawsuits. Column (4) presents OLS regressions where both the dependent 
and explanatory variables are in levels. %Δ denotes the first difference in the natural log of one 
plus the number of respective lawsuits. The power of women executives is measured using the 
number of female executives.  The sample consists of firms included in both Execucomp and 
Audit Analytics databases from the years 2002 to 2011. All the variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All the models include Fama-French 48 industry and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered within a firm, and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Δ(Female 
Execs ≥ 
2)t+1 
Δ(Female 
Execs ≥ 
2)t+1 
Δ(Female 
Execs ≥ 2)t+1 
(Given %Δ 
Operating 
Lawsuits≠0) 
(Female 
Execs ≥ 
2)t+1 
(Levels)¥ 
%ΔSecurities Lawsuits¥ -0.014  -0.018 -0.007 
(-1.12)  (-1.04) (-0.48) 
%ΔOperating Lawsuits¥  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.72) (-0.60) (-0.08) 
ΔFemale Indep. Dir.  
Indicator¥ 
0.013 0.013 -0.012 0.040*** 
(1.58) (1.56) (-0.96) (3.70) 
Δ Firm controls¥ Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No No Yes 
N 6273 6273 2182 6856 
Adj. R2 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 0.080 
Adj. R2 without Industry 
and State FE 
    
0.016 
 
¥ = In column 4, all the variables are in levels.  
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Table 7: Regressions of the number of post-filing settlements and settlement amounts 
This table presents negative binomial (1), OLS (3) and firm fixed effects ((2), (4)) models of the 
number of settlements and settlement dollars among cases filed against a firm in a given year 
(t+1) on variables measuring the power of women executives and control variables in year t. The 
sample includes firms which faced at least one lawsuit as a defendant in a given year and are in 
both Execucomp and Audit Analytics databases. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Negative binomial and OLS models include year and Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects; 
firm fixed effects models include year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered within a firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
# Settlementst+1 
(Neg. Bin.) 
# Settlementst+1 
(Firm FE) 
Ln($ 
Settlement)t+1 
(OLS) 
Ln($ 
Settlement)t+1 
(Firm FE) 
Female Execs ≥ 2 -0.224 -0.033 -0.119 -0.231 
(-1.07) (-0.61) (-0.35) (-0.31) 
Female Execs=1 -0.103 0.011 -0.063 0.302 
(-0.75) (0.36) (-0.26) (0.69) 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator -0.238 0.012 -0.445* 0.118 
(-1.57) (0.42) (-1.69) (0.27) 
Board Independence 0.128 -0.137 0.010 -1.826 
 (0.31) (-1.19) (0.01) (-1.17) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.160*** 0.076** 0.291*** 1.188** 
(2.88) (2.26) (2.92) (2.50) 
Firm Age 0.009** 0.005 0.011 -0.362 
(2.09) (0.06) (1.47) (-0.36) 
Stock Return -0.292* -0.035 -0.450 -0.353 
(-1.96) (-1.55) (-1.60) (-1.07) 
Stock Volatility 0.281*** 0.009 0.417** 0.008 
 (2.59) (0.40) (2.47) (0.03) 
ROA 0.594 0.033 0.615 0.182 
(1.03) (0.69) (1.05) (0.28) 
Cash to Assets -0.100 0.007 -0.277 0.136 
(-0.92) (0.35) (-1.43) (0.50) 
Book Leverage 0.497 0.171 0.613 1.409 
(1.26) (1.38) (0.87) (0.89) 
Firm or industry fixed effects Industry Firm Industry Firm 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2875 2875 2875 2875 
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Table 8: Structural and reduced-form regressions of litigation, firm policies and valuation 
Panel A of this table presents the results of the following system of regressions.  
 
Operating Lawsuits = l0 + l1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1 + l2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + l3(Excess R&D)  + l4(Advtg. Intensity) + l5(CSR Concerns)  
     + Xλ + ZAΛ + εl 
Excess R&D   = r0 + r1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + r2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xρ + ZBB  + εb 
Advtg. Intensity   = a0 + a1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + a2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xα + ZΑΑ  + εa 
CSR Concerns  = c0 + c1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1  + c2(Female Execs=1)t-1  + Xγ + ZΓΓ  + εc 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) = m0 + m1(Female Execs ≥ 2)t-1 + m2(Female Execs=1)t-1 + m 3(Excess R&D) + m4(Advtg. Intensity)   
    + m5(CSR Concerns) + m6(Operating Lawsuits) + Xμ + ZMM + εm      
   
All the variables are defined in the Appendix. Xs represent matrices of common explanatory variables (common to at least two equations in the 
system, e.g., year and industry fixed effects), and Zs are matrices of unique explanatory variables (unique variable(s) to the equation). The sample 
consists of firms included in both Execucomp and Audit Analytics databases from the years 2002 to 2011. The system is estimated using a three-
stage least squares method.  Predicted signs of structural parameters are in parenthesis in front of the estimated coefficients. In panel B, Tobin’s Q 
regression excludes Excess R&D, Advtg. Intensity and CSR Concerns as explanatory variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered within a firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full model of system of equations 
 Structural Parameters (Direct Effect) Reduced-form Parameters (Total Effect) 
 
 
(1) 
Operating 
Lawsuits 
 
(2) 
Excess 
R&D 
 
(3) 
Advtg. 
Intensity 
 
(4) 
CSR 
Concerns
 
(5) 
Ln 
(Tobin’s 
Q) 
(6) 
Operating 
Lawsuits 
(7) 
Excess 
R&D 
(8) 
Advtg. 
Intensity 
(9) 
CSR 
Concerns
(10) 
Ln 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Female Execs ≥ 2 (?) -0.006 (-) -0.005* (-) -0.003 (-) -0.203** (?) 0.042 -0.187*** -0.010*** -0.004* -0.183** -0.029** 
 (-0.08)  (-1.74) (-1.57) (-2.22) (1.55) (-2.70) (-3.49) (-1.71) (-2.00) (-2.57) 
Female Execs=1 (?) 0.005 (-) -0.003 (-) -0.001 (-) -0.124* (?) 0.012 -0.100* -0.004** -0.001 -0.142** -0.017*** 
 (0.10)  (-1.34) (-0.46) (-1.79) (0.79) (-1.90) (-2.12) (-1.12) (-2.11) (-2.69) 
Operating Lawsuits    (?) 0.053**      
   (2.49)      
Excess R&D  (+) 5.460***   (+) 7.966***      
 (2.64)   (16.42)      
Advtg. Intensity  (+) 12.715***     (+) 5.679***      
  (3.19)     (4.01)      
CSR Concerns (+) 0.402***   (?) 0.075***      
 (6.98)   (3.80)      
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Excess Capex (?) 1.617***   (?) 0.906*** 0.347 -0.067*** -0.012 -0.987* -0.241*** 
 (4.34)   (6.46) (1.07) (-4.15) (-1.27) (-1.66) (-4.12) 
Excess Aquis (?) -0.173   (?) -0.652*** 0.154 0.045*** -0.000 0.137 -0.286*** 
 (-1.36)   (-16.97) (1.41) (3.91) (-0.26) (1.05) (-10.92) 
Female Indep. Dir. 
Indicator (?) 0.223*** (?) 0.002 (?) -0.001 (?) -0.584*** (?) 0.030 -0.042 0.002 -0.001 -0.625*** -0.004 
 (4.95)  (0.92) (-1.02) (-9.55) (1.59) (-1.17) (1.20) (-0.97) (-10.40) (-0.70) 
Board Independence (-) -0.074 (?) 0.004 (?) 0.002 (?) 0.408* (?) -0.136*** 0.196 -0.001 0.003 0.576*** -0.001 
  (-0.42)  (0.66) (0.56) (1.85) (-2.67) (1.22) (-0.13) (0.71) (2.60) (-0.04) 
Ln(Total Assets) (+) 0.264** (+) -0.003*** (?) -0.003* (+) 0.608*** (-) -0.188*** 0.217** -0.007*** -0.004** 0.370*** -0.027*** 
 (2.52)  (-2.78) (-1.89) (14.67) (-10.24) (2.12) (-2.78) (-2.46) (4.64) (-3.23) 
Firm Age (-) -0.003 (?) -0.000 (-) -0.000 (+) 0.017*** (-) -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.013*** 0.000 
 (-1.43)  (-0.63) (-1.07) (6.17) (-3.26) (0.26) (0.30) (-0.72) (4.89) (0.24) 
Stock Return (-) -0.027   (-) 0.033 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.039 -0.091*** 
 (-0.60)   (0.80) (0.07) (-0.11) (-0.89) (0.81) (-10.60) 
Stock Volatility (+) -0.009   (+) 0.222*** (?) -0.145*** 0.135*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.241*** -0.022*** 
 (-0.23)   (4.45) (-12.11) (3.54) (4.00) (1.05) (4.95) (-4.32) 
ROA (+) 0.967*** (-) -0.074***  (-) -0.293 (+) 1.204*** -0.178 -0.066*** -0.017*** -0.607*** -0.074 
 (3.62)  (-5.29)  (-1.41) (11.72) (-1.09) (-4.41) (-2.63) (-2.90) (-1.43) 
Cash to Assets (+) -0.079 (+) 0.016*** (+) 0.003** (+) 0.091** (+) -0.065*** 0.119** 0.014*** 0.002* 0.210*** 0.018*** 
 (-1.58)  (5.84) (2.21) (2.11) (-2.79) (2.38) (5.76) (1.90) (3.86) (2.80) 
Ln(Total Compensation) (-) -0.310*   -0.316* 0.002 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-1.78)   (-1.76) (1.64) (0.59) (-0.37) (-1.30) 
Market Concentration (-) -0.250** (-) -0.011** (-) 0.006* (+) 0.426** -0.150 -0.006 0.006** 0.197 0.031** 
 (-2.03)  (-2.44) (1.87) (2.55) (-1.34) (-1.51) (2.21) (1.20) (2.10) 
Book Leverage  (-) -0.011*  (?) -0.001 -0.478*** -0.012* 0.010* -0.597** -0.024 
  (-1.75)  (-0.01) (-3.78) (-1.89) (1.79) (-2.56) (-1.26) 
Product Similarity  (+) 0.005*** (+) -0.000 -0.024 0.005*** -0.000* -0.067*** 0.001 
  (6.82) (-1.00) (-1.55) (6.12) (-1.67) (-5.28) (1.05) 
Lag(Q)  (+) 0.029***  0.149 0.016*** 0.002 0.039 0.839*** 
  (7.85)  (1.43) (4.46) (1.18) (0.47) (76.48) 
Managers' Avg. Vega  (+) 0.000***  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (3.07)  (1.30) (1.58) (0.21) (-0.77) (-1.21) 
Managerial Ownership  (-) -0.000**  -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000* 
  (-1.99)  (-0.30) (-1.00) (3.04) (1.55) (1.93) 
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Ln(Sales)     (+) 0.004***   0.289** 0.002 0.005* 0.064 0.029 
      (2.79)   (2.34) (0.56) (1.73) (0.43) (1.54) 
Gross Margin     (+) 0.034***   0.670*** 0.048*** 0.035*** -0.588*** 0.083*** 
      (6.14)   (3.91) (3.52) (5.87) (-2.81) (3.10) 
CSR Strengths    (+) 0.115*** 0.065*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.105*** 0.004*** 
   (5.70) (3.43) (5.07) (2.47) (5.22) (2.94) 
Securities Lawsuits    (-) -0.043*** 0.247*** 0.000 -0.001 0.067 -0.036*** 
   (-2.84) (4.32) (0.28) (-1.07) (1.04) (-2.94) 
Ln(Market Share)       (+) 0.093*** 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.270** -0.008 
       (4.44) (0.15) (0.58) (0.36) (1.99) (-0.45) 
# Business Segments       (-) -0.003 0.018 0.000 -0.000 -0.024 0.000 
       (-0.58) (0.99) (0.63) (-0.59) (-0.89) (0.13) 
Constant  0.010  0.003 -0.027*** -1.511 1.227*** -0.512 0.033 0.007 1.213 0.114 
  (0.01)  (0.16) (-4.41) (-1.15) (5.83) (-0.45) (1.06) (0.27) (0.67) (0.55) 
Fixed Effects  Ind, Year  Ind, Year Ind, Year
Ind, Year, 
State
Ind, Year Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
N  7156  7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 
Adj. R2     0.302 0.439 0.296 0.508 0.792 
 
Panel B: Model excluding endogenous policies from Tobin’s Q regression 
 Structural Parameters (Direct Effect) Reduced-form Parameters (Total Effect) 
 
 
(1) 
Operating 
Lawsuits 
 
(2) 
Excess 
R&D 
 
(3) 
Advtg. 
Intensity 
 
(4) 
CSR 
Concerns
 
(5) 
Ln 
(Tobin’s 
Q) 
(6) 
Operating 
Lawsuits 
(7) 
Excess 
R&D 
(8) 
Advtg. 
Intensity 
(9) 
CSR 
Concerns
(10) 
Ln 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Female Execs ≥ 2 (?) -0.007 (-) -0.006* (-) -0.003 (-) -0.203** (?) -0.001 -0.187*** -0.010*** -0.004* -0.183** -0.029** 
 (-0.09)  (-1.75) (-1.55) (-2.23) (-0.04) (-2.70) (-3.49) (-1.71) (-2.00) (-2.57) 
Female Execs=1 (?) 0.005 (-) -0.003 (-) -0.001 (-) -0.123* (?) -0.016 -0.100* -0.004** -0.001 -0.142** -0.017*** 
 (0.09)  (-1.47) (-0.47) (-1.79) (-0.90) (-1.90) (-2.12) (-1.12) (-2.11) (-2.69) 
Operating Lawsuits      (?) 0.168***      
    (7.86)      
Excess R&D  (+) 5.306***         
 (2.69)         
Advtg. Intensity  (+) 12.562***           
  (3.12)           
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CSR Concerns (+) 0.401***         
 -0.007         
Other control variables  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects  Ind, Year  Ind, Year Ind, Year 
Ind, Year, 
State Ind, Year 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
Ind, Year, 
State 
N  7156  7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 7156 
Adj. R2        0.302 0.439 0.330 0.509 0.792 
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Table 9: Treatment effect with selection bias model 
The table presents the results of treatment effect models with selection bias using maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE). The instrumental variable for Female Execs ≥ 2 is the fraction of 
male directors on a firm’s board who sit on boards of other companies that have women among 
their top executives (Male Dir. w/ Fem. Exec. Link). All models include year and Fama-French 
48 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered 
within a firm, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Treatment effect model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment models: 
Operating 
Lawsuitst+1 
Excess 
R&Dt+1 
Advtg. 
Intensityt+1 
CSR 
Concernst+1 
Female Execs ≥ 2 -0.661* -0.052*** -0.030*** -2.508*** 
(-1.71) (-4.07) (-17.51) (-27.19) 
Female Execs=1 -0.092* -0.003 0.000 -0.100 
(-1.73) (-1.41) (0.49) (-1.41) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.410*** -0.000 0.001 0.682*** 
(10.51) (-0.11) (1.28) (13.15) 
Firm Age 0.003 -0.000*** -0.000 0.013*** 
(1.53) (-3.06) (-1.15) (5.23) 
Stock Return -0.078 0.002 -0.000 0.109** 
(-1.53) (1.05) (-0.51) (2.18) 
Stock Volatility 0.074** 0.004** -0.000 0.172*** 
(2.10) (2.21) (-0.02) (3.50) 
ROA 0.152 -0.040*** -0.006 -0.501** 
(1.42) (-2.86) (-1.52) (-2.06) 
Cash to Assets 0.047 0.029*** 0.002* 0.021 
(0.84) (7.82) (1.73) (0.54) 
Book Leverage -0.849*** -0.027*** 0.001 -0.634*** 
(-6.14) (-3.99) (0.15) (-2.95) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6898 5769 5769 5711 
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Panel B: Selection model 
 
 
(1) 
Female 
Execs ≥ 2 
(2) 
Female 
Execs ≥ 2 
(3) 
Female 
Execs ≥ 2 
(4) 
Female  
Execs ≥ 2 
Male Dir. w/ Fem. Exec. Link 0.929*** 0.733*** 0.251** 0.144 
(4.47) (3.29) (1.98) (1.08) 
Female Indep. Dir. Indicator 0.316*** 0.256*** 0.182*** 0.264*** 
(3.90) (3.03) (3.27) (5.73) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.114*** -0.150*** -0.010 0.191*** 
(-3.09) (-4.19) (-0.38) (5.32) 
Tobin’s Q -0.011 -0.058 -0.028 -0.040* 
(-0.36) (-1.40) (-1.11) (-1.87) 
CEO Chairman -0.005 0.010 -0.036 -0.052 
(-0.06) (0.13) (-0.74) (-1.07) 
CEO Age -0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.001 
(-1.02) (-1.59) (1.01) (-0.43) 
Operating Lawsuits -0.125 
(-1.13) 
Excess R&D -7.650*** 
(-2.98) 
Advtg. Intensity -37.368*** 
(-17.29) 
CSR Concern -0.485*** 
(-23.00) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6898 5769 5769 5711 
p-value (Wald test of independent 
equations) 0.135 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 
